“U.N. Report Left Out Horrific Details on Syria Chemical Attacks”, The New York Times
By Rick Gladstone and Maggie Haberman, June 20, 2018
At least twice this year, the Syrian military fired Iranian-made artillery shells filled with a chlorine-like substance that oozed poison slowly, giving victims just a few minutes to escape.
In another attack, Syrian forces dropped a chemical bomb on the top-floor balcony of an apartment building, killing 49 people, including 11 children. Their skin turned blue.
These details and others blaming Syria for atrocities in eastern Ghouta, a suburb of Damascus, were uncovered by a United Nations commission investigating and documenting possible war crimes in the seven-year-old conflict. But when the commission issued a report on Wednesday, the details were omitted.
Seven pages that had been in an earlier draft, provided to The New York Times, were summarized in two paragraphs in the final document.
The commission’s report examined how the government of President Bashar al-Assad recaptured eastern Ghouta, the rebel stronghold near the capital, in the first four months of 2018. Mr. Assad’s forces laid siege to the area, using bombardments, mass starvation and chemical weapons.
The materials in the leaked draft paint a far more frightening picture of chemical weapons use in eastern Ghouta than had been previously reported. And they assert without qualification that Syrian forces and their allies were responsible, rebutting repeated denials by Mr. Assad’s government and his backers in Russia and Iran.
A member of the commission explained the omissions, saying that many of the details in the early draft needed additional corroboration or clarification and might be included in another report, perhaps by September. There was no outside pressure to withhold the information, said the member, Hanny Megally, an Egyptian human rights lawyer.
“We thought we need to do some more work on this, it’s an ongoing investigation,” Mr. Megally said. “So we thought, let’s keep it short.”
But the conclusions in the omitted information seemed unambiguous.
The leaked draft stated:
“In one of the most grim patterns of attack documented during the period under review, Government forces and/or affiliated militias continued to use chemical weapons in densely populated civilian areas throughout eastern Ghouta.”
In meticulous detail, the draft enumerated six chemical weapons assaults on civilians from January through April 7, the date of the deadliest assault. In what appeared to be a first, it implicated Iranian-supplied weaponry.
In attacks on Jan. 13, Jan. 22 and Feb. 1, the draft said, government forces fired chemical agents, “most probably chlorine,” into a residential part of eastern Ghouta’s Douma neighborhood, near a sports stadium, roughly 800 yards from the front lines, between 5 a.m. and 6:30 a.m.
Some witnesses described a “slow-acting agent” that smelled like chlorine, the draft said, and they had sufficient time “to rouse the victims, obtain wet cloths to serve as makeshift face masks, and evacuate the affected areas.”
In the Jan. 22 and Feb. 1 attacks, the draft said, the commission had evidence identifying the bomb delivery devices as surface-to-surface industrially produced Iranian artillery rockets, “only known to have been used by Government forces and, rarely, affiliated militias.”
“In relation to the munitions used on 22 January and 1 February, the Commission obtained and assessed material evidence including metadata analysis, and identified a surface-to-surface craft-produced rocket (IRAM). While IRAMs have been employed by a range of actors across Syria, the particular design of observed during these two attacks is only known to have been used by Government forces and rarely, affiliated militias. Specifically, IRAMs documented were built around industrially-produced Iranian artillery rockets known to have been supplied to Syrian Government forces.”
The draft said that the eastern Ghouta attacks had followed “a pattern previously documented by the Commission concerning the use of chemical weapons by Government forces,” and that none of them had suggested “the involvement of armed groups.”
Thirty-one people, including 11 children, were sickened in the first three attacks, but none died. Two other episodes of possible chlorine use, on Feb. 25 and March 7, caused more extensive casualties, killing two children, including an infant, and injuring 18 civilians.
The worst was yet to come, following the collapse of negotiations between Russian military officials and an insurgent group, Jaish al-Islam, to evacuate the Douma neighborhood and end the siege. On April 7, the draft said, an improvised explosive delivered from the air hit a multistory residential building roughly 200 yards from the Rif Damascus Hospital, the last functioning hospital in Douma.
The draft described the explosive as a “single industrial gas cylinder” with fins that struck the top-floor balcony and appeared to have “rapidly released large amounts of a substance into the interior space of the residential apartment building.”
“Positions and physical symptoms displayed by victims of the attack support witness claims that the agent acted rapidly,” the draft stated, “and likely indicate that a high concentration of the chemical sank downwards.”
Based on witness statements and “material evidence received and analyzed by the Commission,” the draft stated, the dead showed “an array of symptoms consistent with exposure to a choking agent, including signs of foaming at the mouth and nose, blue skin indicating impaired blood circulation, meiosis (constriction of the pupils), as well as some cases of dilated (wide open) pupils.”
“Statements and material evidence received and analysed by the Commission in relation to the deceased within the apartment building revealed an array of symptoms consistent with exposure to a choking agent, including signs of foaming at the mouth and nose, blue skin indicating impaired blood circulation, meiosis (constriction of the pupils), as well as some cases of dilated (wide open) pupils. Numerous victims unable to flee the building collapsed shortly after exposure.”
Mr. Megally declined to go into detail over why such information was withheld from the report published on Wednesday. But he said that with the April 7 attack in particular, more information was needed, including precisely what killed the 49 people.
“If we’re not sure what the cause of death was, we may be looking in the wrong place,” he said. “It’s better we finish the investigation, rather than release it in dribs and drabs.”
The official version of the report was far more cautious about the chemical weapons incidents in question. In two attacks, for example, the report said the commission was “unable to obtain sufficient material evidence to conclusively identify the weapons delivery systems.”
While the circumstances in the April 7 attack were “largely consistent with the use of chlorine,” it said, the symptoms were more consistent with the use of “another chemical agent, most likely a nerve gas.”
The official version also condemned rebel forces for indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas.
The commission, which has been compiling evidence of atrocities in the Syria conflict since shortly after the war began in 2011, has developed an extensive array of ways to gather information, even though Mr. Assad has not allowed its investigators into the country. Led by Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, a Brazilian diplomat and rights activist, the commission has even compiled a confidential list of Syrian officials and others who may be held accountable in a court some day.
The earlier draft of its report on eastern Ghouta was shared by a person close to the commission, who had been consulted on the report and who declined to be identified.
The leak suggested some internal dissension in the commission about the strength of its evidence concerning the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons in eastern Ghouta. It was also possible that the commission wanted to exercise caution ahead of an expected report on the April 7 attack in Douma by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which sent investigators to the site.
Chemical weapons are banned by an international treaty that Mr. Assad signed under pressure in 2013, when his government was first accused of having used chemical weapons in the conflict — also in eastern Ghouta.
The April 7 attack in Douma caused widespread international fury, particularly because many victims appeared to have been children shown gagging and choking, based on videos disseminated by witnesses and activists. The attack drew retaliatory missile attacks and airstrikes by Britain, France and the United States.
Mr. Assad’s government, backed by Russia and Iran, sought to cast doubt about the Douma attack, suggesting it had been faked or carried out by insurgents.
The Syrian government and its allies took control of eastern Ghouta two months ago after imposing what the commission’s report described as “the longest siege in modern history,” displacing more than 140,000 people from their homes and unleashing bombardments that destroyed hospitals, markets and schools, and forced residents to live in cellars and basements.
Those bombardments — mainly airstrikes by Syrian and Russian planes — killed 1,100 civilians and injured 4,000 others in a period of less than a month from Feb. 18, the commission said in its report, which is to be delivered to the United Nations Human Rights Council next week.
Tens of thousands of those who fled are still being held unlawfully by the government, which pursued a policy of blanket internment that the panel called “reprehensible.”
Sieges are permitted under international humanitarian law. But, in a departure from established practice, the panel said it considered the way pro-government forces had conducted the siege of eastern Ghouta unlawful.
“Certain acts perpetrated by pro-government forces during the siege laid to eastern Ghouta, including the deliberate starvation of the civilian population as a method of warfare, amount to the crime against humanity of inhumane acts, causing serious mental and physical suffering,” the panel concluded.
Read the Segment of the United Nations Commission Draft Report
A leaked portion of an early draft of the United Nations commission report on the investigation into atrocities committed during the Syrian military’s successful siege of eastern Ghouta:
C. Use of Prohibited weapons
51. In one of the most grim patterns of attack
documented during the period under review,
Government forces and/or affiliated militias
continued to use chemical weapons in densely
populated civilian areas throughout eastern
Ghouta. The use of chemical agents, most
probably chlorine, was carried out by improvised
roeket»assisted munitions (lRAMs), and, in one
instance, air—delivered munitions.
A, January to March
52. For example, Government forces and/or
affiliated militias launched a series of ground
attacks in Douma on 13 and 22 January, and 1
February. The attacked locations were near the
Douma stadium, in Karm al»Rasas, 150 metres
from Harasta and some 800 metres from the
Closest frontline — an area described by victims and
witnesses as a residential neighbourhood inhabited
by civilians with no military presence. All three
attacks were carried out between approximately
5:00 and 6:30am. The first attack, on 13 January,
injured five children, one woman, and one man.
The second, on 22 January, injured six children,
seven women, and eight men. The third attack, on
1 February, injured three women.
53. In all three incidents, victims and witnesses
including treating medical staff described
strikingly similar symptoms, including, but not
limited to: respiratory distress, coughing, burning
eyes, throat irritation. and nausea. Witnesses
consistently recalled the distinctive smell of
chlorine at the affected sites, as well as on the
victims’ clothing. Some witnesses described a
scent similar to bleach and household detergents,
though more pungent.
54. Witnesses further described a slow-acting
agent: upon recognising the smell of chlorine on
xx Jan/Feb, one witness recalled how s/he and
others had sufficient time to rouse the victims,
obtain wet cloths to serve as makeshift facemasks,
and evacuate the affected areas. In all incidents,
first responders effectively treated symptoms with
oxygen and bronchodilators (Lag, Salbutamol). the
use ofwhich is broadly consistent with exposure to
chlorine.
55. In relation to the munitions used on 22
January and 1 February, the Commission obtained
and assessed material evidence including metadata
analysis, and identified a surface-to-surfaee, craftproduced
rocket (IRAM). While IRAMs have been
employed by a range of actors across Syria, the
particular design observed during these two attacks
is only known to have been used by Government
forces and, rarely, affiliated militias. Specifically,
IRAMS documented were built around
industrially—produced Iranian artillery rockets
known to have been supplied to Syrian
Govcmment forces. The particular examples
documented bear markings indicating they were
produced in 2016, and design features consistent
with lRAMs employed by Syrian Government
forces since at least late 2012.
56. The foregoing attacks follow a pattern
previously documented by the Commission
concerning the use of chemical weapons by
Govemment forces, a trend consistently observed
between 2014 and 2017. In none of the foregoing
incidents reviewed did the information gathered
suggest the involvement of armed groups. There
are therefore reasonable grounds to believe that
Government forces and/or affiliated militias
launched lRAMs carrying a chlorine payload in
Douma on 13 January, 22 January, and 1 February.
57. Further evidence on the possible use of
chlorine was received in relation to two other
incidents, the first having uccurred in al-
Shayt‘ouniya (middle sector) on 25 February at
approximately 6:30pm. The attack killed a m/f
infant and a four—year—old b/g, and injured another
18 civilians. A similar incident occurred on 7
March at approximately 10:00p.m., in an area
between Saqba and l—lammouriyeh (middle sector).
The latter attack injured at least 27 individuals. In
both incidents, victims and witnesses including
treating medical staff described symptoms similar
to those mentioned above (para. xx). as well as
similar treatment methods (para. xx). Witnesses
further canststently recognised the smell of
chlorine. In both cases, however. the Commission
was unable to obtain sufficient material evidence
to conclusively identify the weapons delivery
systems.
B. April
53. Following the collapse of ceasefire
negotiations between Jaysh al-lslam and the
Russian Federation to evacuate Douma in early
April, pro-Government forces launched a series of
attacks on the last remaining opposition redoubt on
5, 6, and 7 April (paras. xx-xx). Over the course of
the day on 7 April, numernus aerial attacks struck
various residential areas. At around 7:30pm.. an
improvised air-delivered munitien was air-dropped
on a residential building, killing at least 49
individuals. and injuring up to 650 hundred others.
The injuries sustained ranged in severity, with
some victims having been exposed to a chemical
agent.
59. The attack struck a multi—storey residential
apartment building located approximately 100
metres southwest of Shohada square, close to thc
al-Nuamaan mosque. The residential building was
situated approximately 200 meters from the Rit‘
Damascus Hospital (based in the tanner al-Zeera
building) which, at the time, had moved must ofils
operations underground and was the last
functioning hospital in Dnuma. In addition. the
underground hospital was serving as a makeshift
Shelter for up to 1,000 individuals. The affected
residential building is located at the entrance ofa
tunnel which directly connected to the hospital and
functioned as an entry point for ambulances. The
impact site was localcd in a dcnscly»populated
residential neighbourhood.
60. The improvised munition employed was
based around a single industrial gas cylinder fitted
to a metal frame or “cradle,” with affixed fins and
wheel assemblies. which tore free from its cradle
during impact. The munition struck a top-floor
balcony on the residential building and damaged
the concrete structure, leaving the nose of the
weapon positioned directly abuve a hole into the
room below. Remnants of these modifications,
including distinctive wheel assemblies, are clearly
visible in material evidence received and analysed
by the Commission.
61. The interior ceilings of the residential
building here structural damage consistent with the
munition being air-delivered. One witness saw a
yellow-green cloud emitting from a bomb in flight
falling towards the building. Remnants of the
cylinder also displayed signs of impact damage
and bore markings in a grid pattern 7 which appear
to match those of the wire mesh fencing present at
the impact site, consistent with it having broken
through the mesh in a freefall descent from an
aircraft. Flight observation logs received by the
Commission demonstrate that 7 immediately prior
to the attack 7 several Syrian Government Mil Mi-
8 (“Hip”) helicopters took oti‘ from nearby al-
Dumayr Military Airport and were circling the
town.
62. Damage analysis of the improvised gascylinder
bomb and its positioning appear to
indicate that it rapidly released large amounts ofa
substance into the interior space of the residential
apartment building. The location of victims in
areas of the building lower than the impact point
suggests a heavier-thau—air chemical agent, such as
chlorine, was employed. Positions and physical
symptoms displayed by victims of thc attack
support witness claims that the agent acted rapidly,
and likely indicate that a high concentration of the
chemical sank downwards.
63. Forty-nine (49) individuals were killed as a
result of the attack, most of whom were present in
the residential building. At the site ofthc incident,
rescuers reported finding 43 deceased individuals,
comprising 38 within the building, and five
outside. Upon evaluating and corroborating
witness statements, material evidence. and
comparing lists of victims received, at least 10
men, 16 women, eight girls, and three boys were
killed. As entire families perished, the
Commission was unable to receive a full list of
names. though the identities of 35 victims were
conclusively established. In addition, one woman,
two children, and three men subsequently died
while being treated at Rit‘ Damascus Hospital,
increasing the overall death toll to 49 individuals.
64. Statements and material evidence received
and analysed by the Commission in relation to the
deceased within the apartment building revealed
an array of symptoms conmstent with exposure to
a choking agent7 including signs of foaming at the
mouth and nose, blue skin indicating impaired
blood circulation, meiosis (constriction of the
pupils). as well as some cases of diialed (wide
open) pupils. Numerous victims unable to flee the
building collapsed shortly after exposure.
65. Several interviewees including treating
medical staff confirmed that up to 650 more
indivtduals required medical attendance after
being exposed to a chemical agent. One
interviewee recounted how the Rif Damascus
Hospital received approximately 500 patients
within two hours of the attack, all of whom
presented moderate to severe cases of exposure
consistent with chlorine inhalation. Another
medical staff recounted having personally treated
more than 50 victims 7 some 30 children, 15
women, and 10 men.
66. The majority of victims sustained minor
injuries including throat hum, coughing, and
difficulties in breathing. The treatment of those
moderately affected included immediate removal
of their clothes, thorough washing. and provision
of oxygen. inhalers, and medicine to assist
breathing (9.35., Sal’hutamol). In more severe cases,
atropine and corticosteroids were used.
67. Numerous victims and witnesses described
the strong, distinctive odour of chlorine emanating
from the impact site, in areas surrounding the
residential building, at the entrance of the tunnel to
Rif Damascus Hospital, and on the bodies and
clothes of victims delivered to the hospital. First
responders attempting to reach the scene in its
immediate aftermath were impeded by the
overwheiming smell ofchlorine.
68. Symptoms reported by victims and
witnesses, as well as those visible on material
evidence received by the Commission, are
consistent with the use ofa choking agent such as
chlorine, The majority of fatalities as well as
surviving Victims with varying degrees of
exposure showed no signs of external injury.
Rather, the symptoms exhibited by victims were
indicative of poisoning consistent with exposure to
a high concentration of a toxic chemical, and
material evidence supports this theory. Remnants
of the weapons delivery system analysed by the
Commission are consistent with an improvised
chemical weapon delivered from the air, which
disseminated a liquefied, compressed gas.
Statements from observers, victims, first
responders, and medical staff corroborate each
other and support this conclusion.
69. While it is highly likely that chlorine was
released, it cannot be ruled out at this stage that
another chemical agent was simultaneously
employed. A more likely alternative to the
combined use of two chemical agents would be a
massive chlorine release at a highly lethal
concentration, triggering acute respiratory distress
syndrome and near-immediate collapse.
70. By launching chemical attacks on xxx,
there are reasonable grounds to believe that
Government forces committed the war crime of
taunching indiscriminate attacks in a civilian
populated area, in further violation of the right to
life, liberty, and security of person (Annex III,
paras. xx-xx). The use of chemical weapons
further violated the Convention on the Prohibition
of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
Destruction, ratified by the Syrian Arab Republic
in 2013.