As the Taliban faces protests and dissent across Afghanistan, William Brangham explores the collapse of the country’s government \u2014 built and supported by the U.S. and allies for 20 years. For a deeper perspective, Brangham speaks with Sarah Chayes, who covered the fall of the Taliban after 9\/11 for NPR and served as advisor to several senior U.S. military commanders in Afghanistan.<\/em><\/p>\n Read the Full Transcript<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n Judy Woodruff:<\/strong><\/p>\n We return now to our top story, as the Taliban struggles to rule amid protests and dissent in Kabul and across the country.<\/p>\n William Brangham explores the collapse of the country’s government, which was built and supported by the U.S. and its allies for 20 years.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/li>\n William Brangham:<\/strong><\/p>\n That’s right, Judy.<\/p>\n For some deeper perspective on how we got here, I’m joined now by someone who’s had years-long involvement in Afghanistan.<\/p>\n Sarah Chayes covered the fall of the Taliban after 9\/11 for NPR. She then started and ran several NGOs in the country. She served as adviser to several senior U.S. military commanders in Afghanistan and then to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.<\/p>\n She is the author of several books. The most recent is “On Corruption in America: And What Is at Stake.” And she joins us now from Paris.<\/p>\n Sarah Chayes, great to have you back on the “NewsHour.”<\/p>\n You recently published an essay called “The Ides of August<\/a>,” and, in it, you laid out several factors that you argue helped get us where we are today. And the first element was corruption that you pointed to.<\/p>\n Can you explain the mechanism? How is it that corruption leads to the fall of the Afghan government?<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/li>\n Sarah Chayes:<\/strong><\/p>\n In simple terms, why would a population take risks to fight the Taliban on behalf of a government that is treating them almost as badly as the Taliban do?<\/p>\n So, Afghan government officials would shake people down at every interaction. The massive international funding that was arriving in the country was being siphoned off or captured by government officials and their cronies.<\/p>\n And from Afghans’ perspective, it almost looked like the United States was in favor of this system, because our officials were always seen partnering with these venal Afghan leaders. And no matter how much the population complained, they really couldn’t get us to address the serious \u2014 the issues seriously.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/li>\n William Brangham:<\/strong><\/p>\n What role did the U.S.’ actions play in this? Did we hinder the corruption? Did we help the corruption? Did we try to stop the corruption?<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/li>\n Sarah Chayes:<\/strong><\/p>\n I have to say, on balance, we enormously helped the corruption, as I say, first of all, by allowing local strongmen to capture the revenue streams.<\/p>\n So, for example, you would have one local strongman who is providing security at that \u2014 at a U.S. base, and then he would only allow his people in to our contracting conferences, for example. We never held any of the officials that we were partnering with to account.<\/p>\n I would say that, toward 2009-2010, we began to catch on to this as a serious issue. And so a decision was made to do a test case, with plenty of evidence. It was brilliantly mounted, and it had to do with a haul of approximately $900 million in Kabul Bank, right?<\/p>\n So we’re talking a significant issue here. And the person targeted who was taking a bribe was in the palace, was close to President Karzai. Well, as soon as President Karzai threw a fit about the arrest from his henchman, warrants executed a U-turn, and the U.S. never took corruption seriously after that. That was in 2010.<\/p>\n In 2011, when I was working with the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, there was an interagency policy process that would arrive at a determination, how was the United States going to address corruption? And, explicitly, it was decided that we were not going to focus on any of the high-level corruption, only \u2014 quote \u2014 “street-level” police corruption, which, of course, was the purview of the military.<\/p>\n So, from my perspective, there was a real dereliction of duty on the part of civilian leaderships in the United States.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/li>\n William Brangham:<\/strong><\/p>\n Another factor in the essay that you posted was the role that Pakistan played in all of this.<\/p>\n Can you explain? For people who are not familiar with the dynamics between the two nations, what role did Pakistan play?<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/li>\n Sarah Chayes:<\/strong><\/p>\n The Taliban did not initially arise inside Afghanistan the way we have often heard, in 1994.<\/p>\n The Taliban were, in fact, basically concocted across the border in Pakistan. At that time, Afghanistan was a pretty chaotic, violent place, because it was after the Soviets had withdrawn and there were a lot of different PTSD-suffering militia commanders who were shooting at each other.<\/p>\n And Pakistan was very interested in the long-distance trade routes that crossed Afghanistan. And it was really hard to get convoys, get goods across the country. And so their idea for how to secure their own interests, which both were in trade and were in having some what is often called strategic depth with respect to India, right?<\/p>\n Like, India is their big rival, and they wanted a little bit of room behind them and control over territory and population. So they came up with this idea of Taliban. And they actually market-tested it. And I know this from interviews with locals over a number of years.<\/p>\n Golly, wouldn’t you \u2014 how would you feel about some religious students coming to bring this violence to a stop? And, frankly, people said, anything, you know?<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/li>\n William Brangham:<\/strong><\/p>\n This was Pakistani military intelligence doing this?<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/li>\n Sarah Chayes:<\/strong><\/p>\n That’s exactly right.<\/p>\n And then, in 2003, I watched them begin reconstituting the Taliban. So, Pakistan was playing \u2014 or the Pakistani military intelligence agency was playing this remarkable double game with the United States, where they were playing at being our ally and helping us conduct operations, but they were also essentially arming, equipping, training, and directing the Taliban.<\/p>\n And if you look today at the reactions from Pakistani officials, I mean, they are crowing about the current results, the current outcome.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/li>\n William Brangham:<\/strong><\/p>\n Your essay also touches on the role that former Afghan President Hamid Karzai played in this eventual undoing that we have witnessed. Again, how so?<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/li>\n Sarah Chayes:<\/strong><\/p>\n Again, it’s very counterintuitive, but it was Karzai who initially negotiated the entry of the Taliban into Kandahar back in 1994.<\/p>\n He was basically operating on behalf to have the Pakistani military intelligence agency. Karzai got into a fight with his father about it. Others disagreed with him about it. But that was the role he played. And so, again, it stunned me when I learned this, that our choice to be the first president of Afghanistan was the very one who had ushered the Taliban into power in the first place.<\/p>\n And, today, we see him again emerging as the head of some coordinating committee. And so it makes me ask myself, has he not been conducting this type of negotiations, just like he did back in 1994, with the leaders of the northern cities, who all surrendered almost in unison, and all the other kind of local power brokers that we saw surrender in such quick succession?<\/p>\n That doesn’t just happen by itself. That was prepared.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/li>\n William Brangham:<\/strong><\/p>\n Sarah Chayes, always great to see you.<\/p>\n Your latest book is “On Corruption in America.”<\/p>\n Thank you so much for joining us.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/li>\n Sarah Chayes:<\/strong><\/p>\n Thanks for having me, William.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/article>\n . . .<\/p>\n Now to the article just posted for The New York Times, which will appear in print on the cover of the Sunday edition:<\/p>\n Miscue After Miscue, U.S. Exit Plan Unravels<\/em><\/a><\/p>\n By <\/span>Michael D. Shear,\u00a0<\/span>David E. Sanger,\u00a0<\/span>Helene Cooper,\u00a0<\/span>Eric Schmitt,\u00a0<\/span>Julian E. Barnes<\/span> and Lara Jakes,\u00a0<\/span>Aug. 21, 2021, The New York Times<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n President Biden promised an orderly withdrawal. That pledge, compounded by missed signals and miscalculations, proved impossible.<\/em><\/p>\n WASHINGTON \u2014 The nation\u2019s top national security officials assembled at the Pentagon early on April 24 for a secret meeting to plan the final withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan<\/a>. It was two weeks after President Biden had announced the exit<\/a> over the objection of his generals<\/a>, but now they were carrying out his orders.<\/p>\n In a secure room in the building\u2019s \u201cextreme basement,\u201d two floors below ground level, Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III and Gen. Mark A. Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met with top White House and intelligence officials. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken joined by video conference. After four hours, two things were clear.<\/p>\n First, Pentagon officials said they could pull out the remaining 3,500 American troops<\/a>, almost all deployed at Bagram Air Base, by July 4 \u2014 two months earlier than the Sept. 11 deadline Mr. Biden had set. The plan would mean closing the airfield<\/a> that was the American military hub in Afghanistan, but Defense Department officials did not want a dwindling, vulnerable force and the risks of service members dying in a war declared lost.<\/p>\n Second, State Department officials said they would keep the American Embassy open, with more than 1,400 remaining Americans protected by 650 Marines and soldiers. An intelligence assessment presented at the meeting estimated that Afghan forces could hold off the Taliban for one to two years. There was brief talk of an emergency evacuation plan \u2014 helicopters would ferry Americans to the civilian airport in Kabul, the capital \u2014 but no one raised, let alone imagined, what the United States would do if the Taliban gained control of access to that airport, the only safe way in and out of the country<\/a> once Bagram closed.<\/p>\n The plan was a good one, the group concluded.<\/p>\n Four months later, the plan is in shambles as Mr. Biden struggles to explain how a withdrawal most Americans supported went so badly wrong in its execution. On Friday, as scenes of continuing chaos and suffering at the airport were broadcast around the world, Mr. Biden went so far as to say<\/a> that \u201cI cannot promise what the final outcome will be, or what it will be that it will be without risk of loss.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n Interviews with key participants in the last days of the war<\/a> show a series of misjudgments and the failure of Mr. Biden\u2019s calculation that pulling out American troops \u2014 prioritizing their safety before evacuating American citizens and Afghan allies \u2014 would result in an orderly withdrawal.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n Biden administration officials consistently believed they had the luxury of time. Military commanders overestimated the will of the Afghan forces to fight for their own country and underestimated how much the American withdrawal would destroy their confidence. The administration put too much faith in President Ashraf Ghani of Afghanistan, who fled Kabul as it fell<\/a>.<\/p>\n And although Biden White House officials say that they held more than 50 meetings on embassy security and evacuations, and that so far no Americans have died in the operation, all the planning failed to prevent the mayhem when the Taliban took over Kabul in a matter of days.<\/p>\n Only in recent weeks did the administration change course from its original plan. By then it was too late.<\/p>\n Five days after the April meeting at the Pentagon, General Milley told reporters on a flight back to Washington from Hawaii that the Afghan government\u2019s troops were \u201creasonably well equipped, reasonably well trained, reasonably well led.\u201d He declined to say whether they could stand on their own without support from the United States.<\/p>\n \u201cWe frankly don\u2019t know yet,\u201d he said. \u201cWe have to wait and see how things develop over the summer.\u201d<\/p>\n The president\u2019s top intelligence officers echoed that uncertainty, privately offering concerns about the Afghan abilities. But they still predicted that a complete Taliban takeover was not likely for at least 18 months<\/a>. One senior administration official, discussing classified intelligence information that had been presented to Mr. Biden, said there was no sense that the Taliban were on the march.<\/p>\n In fact, they were. Across Afghanistan the Taliban were methodically gathering strength<\/a> by threatening tribal leaders in every community they entered with warnings to surrender or die. They collected weapons, ammunition, volunteers and money as they stormed from town to town, province to province.<\/p>\n In May, they launched a major offensive in Helmand Province in the south and six other areas of Afghanistan, including Ghazni and Kandahar. Back in Washington, refugee groups grew increasingly alarmed by what was happening on the ground and feared Taliban retribution against thousands of translators, interpreters and others<\/a> who had helped the American war effort.<\/p>\n Leaders of the groups estimated that as many as 100,000 Afghans and family members were now targets for Taliban revenge. On May 6, representatives from several of the United States\u2019 largest refugee groups, including Human Rights First, the International Refugee Assistance Project, No One Left Behind, and the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service logged onto Zoom for a call with National Security Council staff members.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n
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<\/picture><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>A Sinking Feeling<\/h2>\n
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