{"id":16634,"date":"2025-08-10T07:12:10","date_gmt":"2025-08-10T14:12:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/worldcampaign.net\/?p=16634"},"modified":"2025-11-15T22:53:49","modified_gmt":"2025-11-16T06:53:49","slug":"issue-of-the-week-human-rights-war-hunger-disease-economic-opportunity-environment-population-personal-growth","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/worldcampaign.net\/?p=16634","title":{"rendered":"Issue Of The Week: Human Rights, War, Hunger, Disease, Economic Opportunity, Environment, Population, Personal Growth"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p><strong><a href=\"https:\/\/planetearthfdn.org\/news\">Back to News<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" alt=\"photo of interior of back of transport truck filled with women wearing brightly colored and patterned headscarves and children of all ages, with child in foreground pressing hand to face covering his eyes\" srcset=\"https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/8L2Hh3LC7Nqm9kjVlyKO1Zfxo9s=\/0x0:3000x2000\/640x427\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/20250503_CHAD_006383_KBG_low\/original.jpg 640w, https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/He1EfSLDh_00F1H0eoU8_fu3CGM=\/0x0:3000x2000\/750x500\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/20250503_CHAD_006383_KBG_low\/original.jpg 750w, https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/NGlNoQsKCvI4e4T2mFNBtkqX_GM=\/0x0:3000x2000\/850x567\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/20250503_CHAD_006383_KBG_low\/original.jpg 850w, https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/SuOZZ302912dpvdOCjnO_ZIUXUk=\/0x0:3000x2000\/928x619\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/20250503_CHAD_006383_KBG_low\/original.jpg 928w, https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/wiSTjhGerrbnZqMjquXUvMK3WRc=\/0x0:3000x2000\/1536x1024\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/20250503_CHAD_006383_KBG_low\/original.jpg 1536w, https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/5XOUACwJG7r4KQarN480FfwK65A=\/0x0:3000x2000\/1856x1238\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/20250503_CHAD_006383_KBG_low\/original.jpg 1856w\" src=\"https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/Dj2A2Fe4rewAiqSZaxJ-KEqvBOU=\/0x0:3000x2000\/1600x1067\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/20250503_CHAD_006383_KBG_low\/original.jpg\" width=\"1600\" height=\"1067\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Lynsey Addario for&nbsp;<em>The Atlantic<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>Sudanese refugees are relocated from a camp outside Al-Fashir, in Darfur, to the camp in Tin\u00e9, Chad, in early May, after the RSF attacked Al-Fashir. The RSF killed dozens of civilians and set homes and humanitarian offices on fire, forcing more than 400,000 people to flee the camp.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>The End Of Civilization As We Knew It, Part Thirty One<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The worst war on earth is not in Ukraine or Gaza, and has not been for years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The worst war on earth is in Sudan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>And it embodies the end of civilization as we knew it&#8211;the end of international rules on human rights and structures to provide basic needs and stability, the moral collapse and mortal dangers globally&#8211;perhaps more than any other single example.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In the last post, we featured the <a href=\"https:\/\/worldcampaign.net\/?p=16596\">cover story from the August issue<\/a> of the Atlantic on the growing existential threat of nuclear weapons. Now we feature the cover story from the next issue on the destruction of the international order that has been the moral and pragmatic glue that has been necessary for the world to function. Taken together, they paint a terrifying and soul-crushing picture of the current and future prospects for life on earth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The cover story in the upcoming September issue of The Atlantic will be a revelation for most people, because most people don&#8217;t know it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>As author Anne Applebaum writes, &#8220;Sudan\u2019s devastating civil war shows what will replace the liberal order: anarchy and greed.&#8221;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Here&#8217;s an excerpt:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>Statistics are sometimes used to express the scale of the destruction in Sudan. About 14 million people&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/dtm.iom.int\/reports\/dtm-sudan-mobility-update-18?close=true\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">have been displaced<\/a>&nbsp;by years of fighting, more than in Ukraine and Gaza combined. Some 4 million of them have fled across borders, many to arid, impoverished places\u2014Chad, Ethiopia, South Sudan\u2014where there are few resources to support them. At least 150,000 people have died in the conflict, but that\u2019s likely a significant undercounting. Half the population, nearly 25 million people, is&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.wfp.org\/emergencies\/sudan\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">expected to go hungry this year<\/a>. Hundreds of thousands of people are directly threatened with starvation. More than 17 million children, out of 19 million, are not in school. A cholera epidemic rages. Malaria is endemic.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>But no statistics can express the sense of pointlessness, of meaninglessness, that the war has left behind alongside the physical destruction. I felt this most strongly in the al-Ahamdda displaced-persons camp just outside Khartoum\u2014although the word&nbsp;camp&nbsp;is misleading, giving a false impression of something organized, with a field kitchen and proper tents. None of those things was available at what was in fact a former school. Some 2,000 people were sleeping on the ground beneath makeshift shelters, or inside plain concrete rooms, using whatever blankets they had brought from wherever they used to call home. A young woman in a black headscarf told me she had just sat for her university exams when the civil war began but had already \u201cforgot about education.\u201d An older woman with a baby told me her husband had disappeared three or four months earlier, but she didn\u2019t know where or why. No international charities or agencies were anywhere in evidence. Only a few local volunteers from the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/news.un.org\/en\/story\/2024\/02\/1146187\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Emergency Response Rooms<\/a>, Sudan\u2019s mutual-aid movement, were there to organize a daily meal for people who seemed to have washed up by accident and found they couldn\u2019t leave.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>As we were speaking with the volunteers, several boys ostentatiously carrying rifles stood guard a short distance away. One younger boy, dressed in a camouflage T-shirt and sandals\u2014he told me he was 14 but seemed closer to 10\u2014hung around watching the older boys. When one of them gave him a rifle to carry, just for a few minutes, he stood up straighter and solemnly posed for a photograph. He had surely seen people with guns, understood that those people had power, and wanted to be one of them.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>What was the alternative? There was no school at the camp, and no work. There was nothing to do in the 100-degree heat except wait. The artillery fire, the burned television station, the melted refinery, the rapes and the murders, the children in the hospital\u2014all of that had led to nothing, built nothing, only this vacuum. No international laws, no international organizations, no diplomats, and certainly no Americans are coming to fill it.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>The end of the liberal world order&nbsp;is a phrase that gets thrown around a lot in conference rooms and university lecture halls in places like Washington and Brussels. But in al-Ahamdda, this theoretical idea has become reality. The liberal world order has already ended in Sudan, and there isn\u2019t anything to replace it.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>&#8230; \u201cThe world we got to know\u2014the consensus, the Pax Americana, the post\u2013Second World War consensus\u2014is just no more.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>&#8230; This spring, more than 1,700 of the communal kitchens run by volunteers in Sudan closed down entirely, affecting nearly 3 million people, thanks either&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.theatlantic.com\/politics\/archive\/2025\/02\/usaid-dismantle-trump-damage\/681644\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">directly to USAID cuts or to the chaos created by mass U.S.-government layoffs and canceled contracts<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>&#8230; After the Roman empire stopped functioning, many people went on deferring to the distant emperor, acting as if he still mattered; in Sudan, I found similar nostalgia for the interest and engagement that once came from Washington.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>&#8230; On both of my trips to Sudan, I traveled out via Dubai, and each time it felt like a scene from a children\u2019s book, where one of the characters walks through a mirror or a wardrobe and emerges in a completely different universe. In Sudan, some people have nothing except a bowl of bean soup once a day. In the Dubai airport, the Chanel store is open all night, AirPods can be purchased for the flight home, and multiple juice bars serve crushed tropical fruits.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>But despite the illusion of separation, those universes are connected, and the same forces that have destroyed Sudan are coming for other countries too. Violence inspired and fueled by multiple outsiders has already destroyed Syria, Libya, and Yemen, and is spreading in Chad, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and beyond. Greed, nihilism, and transactionalism are reshaping the politics of the rich world too. As old rules and norms fall away, they are not replaced by a new structure. They are replaced by nothing.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The full article, compelling and illuminating beyond overstatement, and all it&#8217;s links to other crtitical articles, follow: <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>THE MOST NIHILISTIC CONFLICT ON EARTH<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>September 2025&nbsp;Issue, The Atlantic<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/xWmPYdMFf6D03hg1srhxF4NgmwQ=\/0x430:8256x5074\/1440x810\/media\/img\/2025\/07\/29\/20250317_06505\/original.jpg\" alt=\"photo through car window of military vehicles and trucks driving on dirt road, one flying flag, with fighters, arms raised, sitting on tops and sides\"\/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Soldiers with the Sudanese Armed Forces return from the front line in Khartoum.&nbsp;(Photograph by Lynsey Addario for The Atlantic)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p><em>Sudan\u2019s devastating civil war shows what will replace the liberal order: anarchy and greed.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>By&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.theatlantic.com\/author\/anne-applebaum\/\">Anne Applebaum<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Photographs by Lynsey Addario<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>AUGUST 6, 2025<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.theatlantic.com\/magazine\/archive\/2025\/09\/sudan-civil-war-humanitarian-crisis\/683563\/\">Listen<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In the weeks&nbsp;before they surrendered control of Khartoum, the Rapid Support Forces sometimes took revenge on civilians. If their soldiers lost territory to the Sudanese Armed Forces during the day, the militia\u2019s commanders would turn their artillery on residential neighborhoods at night. On several consecutive evenings in March, we heard these attacks from Omdurman, on the other side of the Nile from the Sudanese capital.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>From an apartment that would in better times have been home to a middle-class Sudanese family, we would hear one explosion. Then two more. Sometimes a response, shells or gunfire from the other side. Each loud noise meant that a child had been wounded, a grandmother killed, a house destroyed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Just a few steps away from us, grocery stores, busy in the evening because of Ramadan, were selling powdered milk, imported chocolate, bags of rice. Street vendors were frying falafel in large iron skillets, then scooping the balls into paper cones. One night someone brought out folding chairs for a street concert, and music flowed through crackly speakers. The shelling began again a few hours later, probably hitting similar streets and similar grocery stores, similar falafel stands and similar street musicians a couple dozen miles away. This wasn\u2019t merely the sound of artillery, but the sound of nihilism and anarchy, of lives disrupted, businesses ruined, universities closed, futures curtailed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In the mornings, we drove down streets on the outskirts of Khartoum that had recently been battlegrounds, swerving to avoid remnants of furniture, chunks of concrete, potholes, bits of metal. As they retreated from Khartoum, the Rapid Support Forces\u2014the paramilitary organization whose power struggle with the Sudanese Armed Forces has, since 2023, blossomed into a full-fledged civil war\u2014had systematically looted apartments, offices, and shops. Sometimes we came across clusters of washing machines and furniture that the thieves had not had time to take with them. One day we followed a car carrying men from the Sudanese Red Crescent, dressed in white hazmat suits. We got out to watch, handkerchiefs covering our faces to block the smell, as the team pulled corpses from a well. Neighbors clustered alongside us, murmuring that they had suspected bodies might be down there. They had heard screams at night, during the two years of occupation by the RSF, and guessed what was happening.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Another day we went to a crossing point, where people escaping RSF-occupied areas were arriving in Sudanese-army-controlled areas. Riding on donkey carts piled high with furniture, clothes, and kitchen pans, they described a journey through a lawless inferno. Many had been deprived of food along the way, or robbed, or worse. In a house near the front line, one woman told me that she and her teenage daughter had both been stopped by an RSF convoy and raped. We were sitting in an empty room, devoid of decoration. The girl covered her face while her mother was talking, and did not speak at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>At al-Nau Hospital, the largest still operating in the Khartoum region, we met some of the victims of the shelling, among them a small boy and a baby girl, Bashir and Mihad, a brother and sister dressed in blue and pink. The terror and screaming of the night before had subsided, and they were simply lying together, wrapped in bandages, on a cot in a crowded room. I spoke with their father, Ahmed Ali. The recording of our conversation is hard to understand because several people were gathered around us, because others were talking loudly nearby, and because Mihad had begun to cry. Ali told me that he and his family had been trying to escape an area controlled by the RSF but had been caught in shelling at 2 a.m., the same explosions we had heard from our apartment in Omdurman. The children had been wounded by shrapnel. He had nowhere else to take them except this noisy ward, and no plans except to remain at the hospital and wait to see what would happen next.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/a39LpZIhFPQ7qh86F03GvQGGpRc=\/0x0:3000x2000\/928x619\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/20250316_05565_low\/original.jpg\" alt=\"photo from overhead of nurses treating four small children lying in different positions on floor with limbs intertwined, two with their heads resting on a woman's outstretched legs wearing pink crocs and one held in her lap\"\/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Lynsey Addario for&nbsp;<em>The Atlantic<\/em>Medical staff at al-Nau Hospital treat children injured in shelling by RSF forces in Omdurman.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>Like a tsunami, the war has created wide swaths of physical wreckage. Farther out of town, at the Al-Jaili oil refinery, formerly the largest and most modern in the country\u2014the focus of major Chinese investment\u2014fires had burned so fiercely and for so long that giant pipelines and towering storage tanks, blackened by the inferno, lay mangled and twisted on the ground. At the studios of the Sudanese national broadcaster, the burned skeleton of what had been a television van, its satellite dish still on top, stood in a garage near an accounting office that had been used as a prison. Graffiti was scrawled on the wall of the office, the lyrics to a song; clothes, office supplies, and rubble lay strewn across the floor. We walked through radio studios, dusty and abandoned, the presenters\u2019 chairs covered in debris. In the television studios, recently refurbished with American assistance, old tapes belonging to the Sudanese national video archive had been used to build barricades.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Statistics are sometimes used to express the scale of the destruction in Sudan. About 14 million people&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/dtm.iom.int\/reports\/dtm-sudan-mobility-update-18?close=true\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">have been displaced<\/a>&nbsp;by years of fighting, more than in Ukraine and Gaza combined. Some 4 million of them have fled across borders, many to arid, impoverished places\u2014Chad, Ethiopia, South Sudan\u2014where there are few resources to support them. At least 150,000 people have died in the conflict, but that\u2019s likely a significant undercounting. Half the population, nearly 25 million people, is&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.wfp.org\/emergencies\/sudan\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">expected to go hungry this year<\/a>. Hundreds of thousands of people are directly threatened with starvation. More than 17 million children, out of 19 million, are not in school. A cholera epidemic rages. Malaria is endemic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>But no statistics can express the sense of pointlessness, of meaninglessness, that the war has left behind alongside the physical destruction. I felt this most strongly in the al-Ahamdda displaced-persons camp just outside Khartoum\u2014although the word&nbsp;<em>camp<\/em>&nbsp;is misleading, giving a false impression of something organized, with a field kitchen and proper tents. None of those things was available at what was in fact a former school. Some 2,000 people were sleeping on the ground beneath makeshift shelters, or inside plain concrete rooms, using whatever blankets they had brought from wherever they used to call home. A young woman in a black headscarf told me she had just sat for her university exams when the civil war began but had already \u201cforgot about education.\u201d An older woman with a baby told me her husband had disappeared three or four months earlier, but she didn\u2019t know where or why. No international charities or agencies were anywhere in evidence. Only a few local volunteers from the&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/news.un.org\/en\/story\/2024\/02\/1146187\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Emergency Response Rooms<\/a>, Sudan\u2019s mutual-aid movement, were there to organize a daily meal for people who seemed to have washed up by accident and found they couldn\u2019t leave.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/O6V4xInx4WTBmeKT1iBozAjWvAw=\/0x0:3000x2000\/928x619\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/20250504_CHAD_009340_KBG_low\/original.jpg\" alt=\"photo of food distribution with child wearing yellow soccer jersey in foreground and chaotic scene of women and children filling bowls with arid landscape in background\"\/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Lynsey Addario for&nbsp;<em>The Atlantic<\/em>In Tin\u00e9, a Chadian border town, Sudanese refugees scramble for food provided by a local Emergency Response Room, part of a humanitarian network that has distributed medical aid and food to millions.<strong>&nbsp;<\/strong><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>As we were speaking with the volunteers, several boys ostentatiously carrying rifles stood guard a short distance away. One younger boy, dressed in a camouflage T-shirt and sandals\u2014he told me he was 14 but seemed closer to 10\u2014hung around watching the older boys. When one of them gave him a rifle to carry, just for a few minutes, he stood up straighter and solemnly posed for a photograph. He had surely seen people with guns, understood that those people had power, and wanted to be one of them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>What was the alternative? There was no school at the camp, and no work. There was nothing to do in the 100-degree heat except wait. The artillery fire, the burned television station, the melted refinery, the rapes and the murders, the children in the hospital\u2014all of that had led to nothing, built nothing, only this vacuum. No international laws, no international organizations, no diplomats, and certainly no Americans are coming to fill it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>The end of the liberal world order<\/em>&nbsp;is a phrase that gets thrown around a lot in conference rooms and university lecture halls in places like Washington and Brussels. But in al-Ahamdda, this theoretical idea has become reality. The liberal world order has already ended in Sudan, and there isn\u2019t anything to replace it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>to understand sudan,&nbsp;as the British Sudanese writer Jamal Mahjoub once wrote, you need a kind of atlas, one containing transparent cellophane maps that can be placed on top of one another, like the diagrams once used in encyclopedias to show the systems inside the human body. One layer might show languages; the next, ethnic groups; the third, ancient kingdoms and cities: Kush, Napata, Meroe, Funj. When the maps are viewed simultaneously, \u201cit becomes clear,\u201d Mahjoub explained, that \u201cthe country is not really a country at all, but many.\u201d Deborah Scroggins, a foreign correspondent who once covered Africa for&nbsp;<em>The Atlanta Journal-Constitution<\/em>\u2014a job that\u2019s hard now to imagine ever existed\u2014wrote in 2002 that a version of Mahjoub\u2019s cellophane atlas could also help explain how Sudan\u2019s wars and rebellions are provoked not just by ethnic and tribal divisions but by economic, colonial, and racial divisions, each one layered onto the next so as to create a \u201cviolent ecosystem capable of generating endless new things to fight about without ever shedding any of the old ones.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>On top of these older maps, new ones now must be overlaid. One might show the divisions created by a more recent war of ideas. On one side of that battle are the Sudanese professionals, lawyers, students, and grassroots activists who in December 2018 launched a broad, popular protest movement, one that called for the rule of law, basic rights, economic reform, and democratic institutions. Their slogan, chanted on streets and painted on walls, was \u201cFreedom, peace, and justice.\u201d In April 2019, following years of organizing, several months of street demonstrations, and violent clashes between civic activists and the military and police, the military&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/world\/africa\/sudans-military-expected-to-announce-overthrow-of-president-following-months-of-popular-protests\/2019\/04\/11\/bedcc28e-5c2b-11e9-842d-7d3ed7eb3957_story.html\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">removed Sudan\u2019s long-standing dictator, Omar al-Bashir<\/a>, along with his repressive Islamist regime, in an attempt to appease this mass civic movement. A civilian government then briefly ruled the country, backed by the military. The prime minister of that transitional government, Abdalla Hamdok, who now lives in Abu Dhabi, told me that the \u201chopes and aspirations of people that were coming together at that time were beyond imagination.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>But even as the civilians took charge, the Sudanese military never relinquished an older set of ideas: that officers should control the government, restrict the national conversation, dominate resources. In 2021, acting on those beliefs, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, together with his deputy, Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2021\/10\/25\/world\/africa\/sudan-military-coup.html\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">carried out a coup and removed Prime Minister Hamdok<\/a>. Burhan leads the Sudanese Armed Forces, widely known as the SAF, the body that has ruled Sudan, under different leaders, for many decades. Hemedti&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2023\/04\/17\/world\/africa\/paramilitary-rsf-explainer.html\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">controls the RSF, a mostly Darfurian militia<\/a>&nbsp;created by Bashir to control ethnic minorities and repress rebel groups. The RSF, whose first members were Arabic-speaking nomads, was originally known as the Janjaweed, an Arabic word meaning \u201cdevils on horseback.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/AEjt8o0zc96LqYYYLAFEBdiqlGg=\/0x0:3000x2000\/1600x1067\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/20250501_CHAD_002022_KBG_low\/original.jpg\" alt=\"photo of people climbing into very tall-sided truck, with one woman on top holding a baby next to another woman reaching for a small child with arms outstretched that is being handed up to her from a woman on the ground, who is surrounded by other woman and children\"\/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Lynsey Addario for&nbsp;<em>The Atlantic<\/em>In Tin\u00e9, a woman passes a child up to another woman in a truck of newly arrived Sudanese refugees. Every month, tens of thousands of people fleeing the civil war descend on the town.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>As many predicted, Burhan and Hemedti fell out. Although it is unclear who fired the first shot, on April 15, 2023, the RSF attacked the SAF headquarters, the Khartoum airport, and the presidential palace. Burhan, genuinely surprised by at least the timing of the attack, remained trapped for many weeks. According to one version of events, he was freed with the help of Ukrainian commandos; another says that he finally shot his way out. After that, Sudan&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.theatlantic.com\/photo\/2023\/05\/photos-sudan-war-refugees\/673934\/\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">fractured into a multilayered conflict<\/a>&nbsp;that now involves not just the RSF and the SAF, but a bewildering array of smaller armies and militias that fight alongside and against them. The democracy movement split too, with some former members of the civilian government finding themselves on the side of the RSF, others with the SAF.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The chaos enabled the spread of what might be described as a third ruling idea, neither democratic nor statist, but rather anarchic, nihilistic, transactional. This ideology, if that is what it can be called, was unleashed in Khartoum in the spring of 2023, during an evacuation so violent and chaotic that people I spoke with wept while talking about it two years later. Embassies, international agencies, and United Nations food-storage sites were looted. Private apartments were ransacked, stripped of furniture and possessions. Three World Food Programme employees were killed during the chaos. The Sudanese army fled to Port Sudan, a small coastal city on the Red Sea that had neither the infrastructure nor the mindset to be the capital of a large country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>As the violence continued, civilians became not just accidental casualties of the fighting but its target. The RSF\u2019s coalition contains a wide collection of fighters from across Sudan whom it can\u2019t always control, as well as mercenaries from central and eastern Africa. At a SAF-controlled prison on the Omdurman army base, I was introduced to one of the mercenaries, a 17-year-old Chadian who said he had been duped into joining the RSF by a recruiter who came to his football club and offered everyone there the equivalent of $2,000 just to sign up. He went right away, without telling his parents; got a week\u2019s training; fought for a few days; and then was captured, in February 2024. He never saw the money, which is a common story. Many RSF fighters aren\u2019t paid, which gives them extra incentive to rob civilians, loot property, and obey commanders who promise they will be rewarded for displacing villages or evicting people who occupy coveted land. The SAF, which is the only group with an air force, has carried out extensive bombing campaigns on civilian neighborhoods, taken lawless revenge on alleged collaborators in recaptured areas, and&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2025\/01\/16\/world\/africa\/sudan-chemical-weapons-sanctions.html\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">been accused of using chemical weapons, which it denies<\/a>. Both the RSF and the SAF&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2025\/6\/17\/un-fact-finding-mission-says-sudan-conflict-escalating-aid-weaponised\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">have used food as a weapon<\/a>, depriving their enemies of access to outside aid and creating obstacles for aid organizations operating inside the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/wuyTt2uId0InwyIqz3jCaMi11ME=\/0x0:2100x1400\/800x533\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/20250317_06273_low\/original.jpg\" alt=\"a woman in a brilliant-red head scarf and face covering sitting in room, looking up and to left, with young child sitting in her lap looking at camera\"\/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Lynsey Addario for&nbsp;<em>The Atlantic<\/em>Afra and Asila, her 3-year-old daughter, photographed near Omdurman, after they\u2019d fled from RSF-controlled territory, where Afra says she was raped by two men<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>The intensity of this violence is partly explained by gold, mined in Sudan since antiquity. Any Sudan atlas should contain a cellophane layer showing the location of gold mines, as well as those of the many people inside and outside the country who want access to them. Tiny artisanal gold mines, a misleadingly charming term, can be found all around the country. We stopped at one on the road from Khartoum to Port Sudan that was no more than a deep hole in the ground and a shack made of plastic sheets, wooden sticks, and bits of straw, housing a single miner. But there are also much larger mines, some connected to the broad seam of gold deposits running under the Sahara, discovered in 2012, that has sparked violence in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, as well as in Chad and Sudan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p id=\"injected-recirculation-link-0\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.theatlantic.com\/international\/archive\/2025\/05\/humanitarian-disaster-sudan-chad\/682758\/\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Read: The crisis of American leadership reaches an empty desert<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>These larger mines shape Sudanese politics in both open and covert ways. Hemedti\u2019s control over a large gold deposit in Jebel Amir, in North Darfur, is part of what consolidated his command of the RSF. Burhan and Hemedti launched their coup in 2021 partly because they feared that civilian control of the military would restrict their access to gold and other resources. Both the SAF and the RSF fund their soldiers by exporting gold\u2014mostly illegally, to get around sanctions, and often through the United Arab Emirates. Last year,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2024\/12\/11\/world\/africa\/sudan-gold-rush-heart-civil-war.html\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><em>The New York Times<\/em>&nbsp;published<\/a>&nbsp;a description of a plane at the airport in Juba, South Sudan, being loaded with $25 million worth of Darfuri gold, bound for the UAE. The Russian Wagner Group, now reorganized and renamed the Africa Corps\u2014a name accidentally or intentionally evoking&nbsp;<em>Afrika Korps<\/em>, the Nazi expeditionary force\u2014<a href=\"https:\/\/bloodgoldreport.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/12\/The-Blood-Gold-Report-2023-December.pdf\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">has gold interests too<\/a>, as do Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Indeed, to fully explain not just the role of gold in the conflict, but also the role of these many outside forces, we need a final layer of cellophane: a map of foreign influence showing Sudan\u2019s place in an anarchic, post-American world, an era that does not yet have a name. Colonialism is long past, the Cold War has ended, and now the disappearance of any form of international order has left Sudan as the focus of intense competition among countries that are not superpowers but rather middle powers. The middle powers send money and weapons into Sudan, hoping to shape the outcome of the conflict. Some take part in the war of ideas. Some want gold. Some are there because their rivals are there, and Sudan is a good place to fight.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/TUjIbIsIxTVLW3kqOxbcx9_9clE=\/0x0:3000x1997\/928x618\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/20250508_CHAD_017777_KBG_low\/original.jpg\" alt=\"photo of the dark interior of a debris-strewn room, with numerous people silhouetted in light coming through open doorways in the background\"\/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Lynsey Addario for&nbsp;<em>The Atlantic<\/em>Civilians displaced from SAF-controlled areas of Sudan are now staying in an unfinished building in El Geneina.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/o0nrkufdnAcmIf255rgJ6C5zA3o=\/0x0:6048x4032\/655x437\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/20250507_CHAD_012324_KBG\/original.jpg\" alt=\"photo of young girl in braids wearing red pants facing camera, with mottled scars covering her face and bare chest, and a damaged turquoise blue wall behind\"\/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Lynsey Addario for&nbsp;<em>The Atlantic<\/em>Manahi Ghasi Taghil, age 6, was injured by mortar fire in Omdurman.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>The middle powers include Turkey, which has historic links to Sudan as well as an interest\u2014as one Turkish diplomat told me\u2014in making sure Sudan is governed by&nbsp;<em>someone<\/em>. Both the Saudis, who are just across the Red Sea\u2014Jeddah is an hour\u2019s flight from Port Sudan\u2014and the Egyptians share this sympathy for hierarchy and control. Egypt has ties to the Sudanese military going back to the 19th century, and the Saudis have made major investments in Sudanese land and agriculture. All three countries either sell weapons to the SAF, or fund their purchase.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>On the other side of the conflict, the Emiratis not only back the RSF; they do so with enough money and commitment to spark conspiracy theories. After an iftar meal in Port Sudan, a Sudanese military officer got out a map, swept his hand across the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, and told me that the Emiratis were transforming Arabic-speaking nomads into a force designed to dominate the whole region, to create a new empire. I also heard more convoluted theories about alleged Israeli interests, or even American interests, hiding behind the Emirati support of the RSF, for which no evidence exists.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Plenty of evidence does&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2025\/06\/29\/world\/middleeast\/emirates-manchester-city-soccer-sudan.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&amp;referringSource=articleShare\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">connect the UAE to the RSF\u2019s gold-trading operations<\/a>, as well as to the Sudanese army\u2019s gold interests, but Abu Dhabi has other ties of business and sympathy to the RSF too. Emirati leaders have in the past hired the RSF to fight on their behalf in Libya and Yemen (the Saudis have also hired the RSF to fight in Yemen). They have donated billions in aid to Sudan and Sudanese refugees, using some of it to build hospitals in Chad and South Sudan that are known (or believed) to treat RSF fighters. Above all, the Emiratis are&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2024\/09\/21\/world\/africa\/uae-sudan-civil-war.html\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">repeatedly accused<\/a>\u2014by the Sudanese military, the United States, and the UN\u2014of supplying the RSF with the money and weapons to fight the war, using their humanitarian aid as a cover, a charge they repeatedly deny. When asked, the Emiratis say that their primary interest in Sudan is to help reestablish an independent civilian government, and to prevent the return of an Islamist regime that threatens maritime trade and regional security. \u201cWe\u2019d like not to see Sudan become a global hub of terrorism again\u201d is how Lana Nusseibeh, a senior UAE diplomat who has been involved in Sudan negotiations, put it to me.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The Iranians, by contrast, might be happy to see the return of an Islamist regime, or at least a government with some Islamist factions. The Iranians once enjoyed a close relationship with Bashir, the SAF reestablished direct relations with Iran in 2023, and Islamist militias are fighting alongside the SAF right now. Outside Khartoum, we saw one of them waving flags and rifles from a military truck heading to the front line. But Iran clearly sees Sudan as a market for weapons, too: Iranian military transit planes have been&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/adf-magazine.com\/2024\/11\/report-iranian-weapon-deliveries-back-sudanese-armed-forces\/\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">identified in Port Sudan,<\/a>&nbsp;and Iranian drones have been&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/middle-east\/are-iranian-drones-turning-tide-sudans-civil-war-2024-04-10\/#:~:text=Iranian%2Dmade%20drones%20enabled%20army,a%20dozen%20Khartoum%20residents%20said.\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">seen on the battlefield<\/a>. Its motives might be not only ideological or economic. It may also be attracted by the vacuum: If the Turks, Saudis, and Emiratis are there, perhaps the Iranians simply feel that they need to be there too.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>That same vacuum has drawn in the Russians as well, not on one side but on both. The Russians\u2019 attitude toward Sudan is entirely amoral, and completely transactional. They buy gold from both sides and sell weapons to both sides. Their mercenaries have worked with the RSF in the past; they have also wanted, for many years, to build a naval base on the Red Sea coast, and so now work with the SAF as well. Because they are there, the Ukrainians are there too. When I told a Ukrainian acquaintance that I would be traveling to Sudan, he turned pale and told me to stay well away from Russian mercenaries, because they might be targets for the Ukrainians. Their numbers are tiny and their interests are narrow, but their presence reveals a lot about the war. The Ukrainians hunting Russians in Sudan are drawn not by any interest in the conflict, but by the anarchy itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Turkish, Egyptian, Saudi, Emirati, Qatari, Russian, Iranian, and Ukrainian interests intersect and overlap on this final layer of cellophane, helping make Sudan, like Yemen and Libya, a place where antagonists from around the planet fund violent proxy wars, at the expense of the people who live there. Sudan\u2019s neighbors, including Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, Chad, Libya, and the Central African Republic, also get drawn into the conflict, either by the middle powers or through links of their own. The Chinese hover in the background, looking for business deals. Sudan\u2019s&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.economist.com\/middle-east-and-africa\/2025\/04\/16\/a-new-smash-and-grab-for-red-sea-ports\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">strategic location on the Red Sea<\/a>, one of the world\u2019s most important shipping lanes, attracts everyone too. Meanwhile, the countries that might once have banded together to stop the fighting have lost interest or capacity. The institutions that might once have helped broker a cease-fire are too weak, and can\u2019t or won\u2019t help. \u201cWe live in a very interesting, many people call it, new world order,\u201d Hamdok, the former Sudanese prime minister, told me. \u201cThe world we got to know\u2014the consensus, the Pax Americana, the post\u2013Second World War consensus\u2014is just no more.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>i made two trips&nbsp;to Sudan this year, to both sides of the front line. Both times I was escorted by people who wanted to present their view of the war, explain why it had started, and show me the atrocities committed by the other side. In Khartoum and Port Sudan, I traveled with a SAF information officer, as well as two other American women. Because there are hardly any foreigners in Sudan right now, let alone any American women, we attracted attention, hope, and some annoyance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Several people stopped us on the street to tell us, with pride, that they had previously worked for the UN, the U.S., or a foreign embassy before they all vanished. One woman approached us, told us she was a Christian, and then drifted away, disappointed, when she learned we were not Christian aid workers. \u201cI have a message for Washington,\u201d a man standing in the courtyard of al-Nau Hospital declared. I turned on my recorder, and he spoke into it: \u201cSave Sudan; we are in need for the medicine.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Others already knew that medicine, like other forms of aid, might no longer be coming. At a communal kitchen in a Khartoum suburb, a local volunteer told us that his team had been serving a very simple bean stew five days a week. Because of American funding cuts\u2014probably a few pennies\u2019 worth of funding cuts, piddling amounts of money that had once trickled down to this half-ruined side street\u2014they were down to three days a week. He said they would be soliciting on social media for more funds, and he hoped to find enough for two more weekly meals soon. He was not alone: This spring, more than 1,700 of the communal kitchens run by volunteers in Sudan closed down entirely, affecting nearly 3 million people, thanks either&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.theatlantic.com\/politics\/archive\/2025\/02\/usaid-dismantle-trump-damage\/681644\/\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">directly to USAID cuts or to the chaos created by mass U.S.-government layoffs and canceled contracts<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/L72MBo4OzNJ25s7j6Y-kDMwou3A=\/0x0:3000x2000\/928x619\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/20250316_02733A_low\/original.jpg\" alt=\"photo of man in military uniform in damaged room filled with debris, with roll-down door half-destroyed and riddled with bullet holes \"\/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Lynsey Addario for&nbsp;<em>The Atlantic<\/em>A soldier with the Sudanese Armed Forces surveys wreckage in Khartoum in May, 10 days before the army announced that it had seized the city back from the RSF.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>Still others wanted to make clear how grateful they were for the tiny amounts of help they had received, so much so that I felt ashamed. At another Omdurman medical facility, the Al-Buluk pediatric hospital, a young physician, Ahmed Khojali, told me that he still had some packages of Plumpy\u2019Nut, a special nutritional supplement. The American government in theory still sends supplies of Plumpy\u2019Nut to severely malnourished children around the world, but&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.theatlantic.com\/health\/archive\/2025\/04\/usaid-doge-children-starvation\/682484\/\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">distribution has been interrupted<\/a>. Khojali took us to see the hospital\u2019s malnutrition unit. About two dozen new patients were arriving every week this spring; we saw a ward full of them, emaciated children with closed faces, lying beside their exhausted mothers, most of whom did not want to be interviewed or photographed. When the children first arrive, Plumpy\u2019Nut is one of the few things they can eat. Khojali knew that some Americans wanted to cut aid because it is wasteful. \u201cWe didn\u2019t waste it; we just use it,\u201d the doctor said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>But not all of the comments concerned American aid. In Khartoum, Darfur, and everywhere exiled Sudanese now gather\u2014Abu Dhabi, London, N\u2019Djamena, Washington\u2014I spoke with ambassadors, experts, diplomats, and politicians who repeatedly asked not just about American humanitarians, but also about the Americans who would come from the White House to negotiate, knock heads together, and find a way to end the war. They wanted Americans who would galvanize the rest of the international community, rope in the UN, bring some peacekeepers, make something happen: the Jimmy Carter\u2013at\u2013Camp David or the Richard Holbrooke\u2013at-Dayton model of big-league, American-led, problem-solving diplomacy, which once played a role in Sudan too, during both Democratic and Republican administrations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>After the Roman empire stopped functioning, many people went on deferring to the distant emperor, acting as if he still mattered; in Sudan, I found similar nostalgia for the interest and engagement that once came from Washington. When I first met Colonel Hassan Ibrahim, the Sudanese army\u2019s media liaison in Khartoum, he introduced himself with an earnest speech, described his country\u2019s conflict as a \u201cforgotten war,\u201d and spent several days helping us find ways around the army\u2019s strict rules so that Americans could learn the truth about Sudan, and so that the truth would inspire American action. Volker Perthes, a former UN official, assured me that Americans \u201cdo have clout if they want to use it.\u201d A Middle Eastern ambassador in Port Sudan thought I was joking when I suggested that the U.S. might no longer care that much about Africa. That was beyond his imagination, and beyond the imagination of many other people who still believe that someday, somehow, American diplomats are going to come back and make a difference.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Admittedly, the speed of the shift is bewildering. Not that long ago, Sudan did inspire American compassion. Starting in the 1980s, the conflict between the mostly Muslim northern Sudan and the mostly Christian south provoked the interest and engagement of American evangelicals. Franklin Graham\u2019s charity, Samaritan\u2019s Purse, along with World Vision and other Christian charities, had strong links to Sudanese churches and, at different times, southern rebels. They still do: Samaritan\u2019s Purse maintains its own aircraft and its own aid-distribution network in Sudan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In the 2000s, American churches, synagogues, and secular groups were also angered and engaged by the Bashir regime\u2019s use of the Janjaweed, the precursors of the RSF, to&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/wp-dyn\/articles\/A8364-2004Sep9.html\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">ethnically cleanse the Darfur region of non-Arab tribes<\/a>. The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, in Washington, projected dramatic photographs from Darfur onto its exterior walls in 2006. A photography exhibition also traveled to several universities. At different times, George Clooney, Angelina Jolie, Mia Farrow, Don Cheadle, and Keira Knightley visited Sudan, raising awareness and money.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>These campaigns made an impact. George W. Bush had deep links to the faith-based charities that worked in Sudan, and arrived in office determined to help. The Obama administration believed in America\u2019s \u201cresponsibility to protect,\u201d to help vulnerable groups avoid slaughter and genocide. Both invested real diplomatic and political effort in Sudan, largely because Americans wanted them to. Melissa Zelikoff, who was part of Joe Biden\u2019s National Security Council, told me that when she began working on Sudan for the State Department, in the 2010s, \u201cwe had a 25-person special-envoy office. We had teams working on every region, on every issue, thinking through negotiating tactics and approaches.\u201d Alexander Laskaris, a former State Department diplomat who worked in Africa for decades, most recently as ambassador to Chad, calls this effort \u201ca remarkable expression of the compassion of the American people acting through their civil-society organizations on government.\u201d I asked him what that effort had produced, given that violence has continued. \u201cWe saved a lot of lives,\u201d Laskaris told me. \u201cA lot of lives.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Americans also helped end the north-south civil war, one of the longest-running in Africa. In 2011, more than 99 percent of South Sudanese&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/world-africa-12317927\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">voted for independence<\/a>&nbsp;in a referendum that had international backing. A wave of American support for South Sudan\u2014diplomatic, political, humanitarian\u2014followed. Now, only 14 years later, the scale and ambition of that aid are almost inconceivable. Kate Almquist Knopf, a former U.S. official who spent nearly two decades as an Africa expert at USAID and then the Department of Defense, sounded almost nostalgic when she told me that South Sudan, which is again experiencing political violence, \u201csquandered a moment that will never come again.\u201d Regardless of who is president, she said, \u201cneither party is ever likely to be willing to do that again for a country in Africa.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Attention dwindled from the 2011 peak, slowly at first and then very fast. Independent South Sudan&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.theatlantic.com\/ideas\/archive\/2019\/05\/theres-still-hope-for-south-sudans-peace-agreement\/589492\/\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">descended into internal ethnic conflict and failed to thrive<\/a>. Backers became disillusioned. Few newspapers could pay for continued coverage\u2014meaning hardly any reporters from places like&nbsp;<em>The Atlanta Journal-Constitution<\/em>\u2014and the story slipped out of the headlines. Maybe photographs from foreign wars became too familiar. Maybe Americans became indifferent. Social media brought a deluge of misinformation, about Sudan and everywhere else, producing a culture of cynicism and sneering. Compassion became unfashionable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>American politics changed too. The first Trump administration dropped the \u201cresponsibility to protect\u201d idea immediately\u2014and when it did, so did everyone else. Nor was Donald Trump\u2019s State Department especially interested in the Sudanese democratic revolution of 2019. Instead of promoting a government that offered the first real possibility for peace and reconciliation in decades, Trump\u2019s team was&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.wilsoncenter.org\/article\/trumps-return-what-it-means-sudans-crisis\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">mostly interested in persuading Sudan to sign the Abraham Accords and recognize Israel<\/a>, which the civilian government agreed to do, in January 2021, in exchange for the removal of Sudan from a list of countries that promote terrorism. As part of that deal, the administration did belatedly allocate funds to aid the transitional government, but the money was suspended again 10 months later, after the coup, mostly unspent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Even after Biden took office, American popular and political attention focused first on Afghanistan and then on Ukraine and Gaza; it never returned to Sudan. After the 2021 coup, U.S. diplomats\u2014working with the British, the Saudis, the Emiratis, and the UN\u2014did try to bring back the 2019 power-sharing arrangement, a negotiation that certainly never got any high-level, Camp David\u2013style attention and mostly excluded the civilians who had led the revolt against Bashir. The group left discussions of security-sector reform to the very end, and ignored reports of military movement around Khartoum. \u201cNo need to panic,\u201d one senior U.S. official told colleagues, only hours before the widely anticipated war broke out.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/yXNcwG30ozKtlzIfVtYIwKViOf0=\/0x0:3000x2000\/928x619\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/20250316_05448_low\/original.jpg\" alt=\"photo of group of men entering iron-gated doorway with door open, two of them helping a third walking in long white robe covered in bright crimson blood, with more patients sitting along the wall\"\/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Lynsey Addario for&nbsp;<em>The Atlantic<\/em>After the shelling of a residential area near Khartoum by RSF forces, injured Sudanese civilians are treated by medical staff at al-Nau Hospital, in Omdurman.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>No American diplomats have returned since then, with one exception. In February 2024, the Biden administration finally appointed an envoy to Sudan, former Representative Tom Perriello, who, without much internal support or presidential attention, did spend one day in Port Sudan (the most that post-Benghazi security rules would allow) and launched a new format for weekly negotiations. Eight months after Trump\u2019s reelection, the Trump administration had not appointed a replacement envoy, nor indeed any senior officials with deep experience in Africa at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Until this year, the U.S. nevertheless&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/abcnews.go.com\/Politics\/humanitarian-system-struggles-fill-us-void-sudan-worlds\/story?id=123483196\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">remained the largest donor to Sudan<\/a>, not only providing hundreds of millions of dollars in aid but also supporting the logistics for UN and other aid operations inside and outside the country, and for Sudanese refugees around the world. In Sudan, the U.S. still had the clout to insist on some aid getting to both sides of the conflict, even if that meant dealing with the RSF over the objections of the SAF. \u201cThe one thing that still remained of U.S. soft power was USAID,\u201d Perriello told me. \u201cI do think we were mitigating the worst famine on Earth.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>But that scale of support was made possible by the dedication of a previous generation, especially of older congressional members and staffers who still remembered the former U.S. role in Sudan, even if they rarely spoke to constituents about it. Now Washington is run by people who are indifferent, if not hostile, to aid policies that had bipartisan acceptance only a few years ago. In February of this year, I spoke with one USAID official who had been directly responsible for humanitarian aid to Sudanese refugees outside Sudan. She told me that although she had known that the Trump administration would make cuts, she had not anticipated the catastrophic impact of&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.theatlantic.com\/politics\/archive\/2025\/02\/usaid-dismantle-trump-damage\/681644\/\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">Elon Musk\u2019s assault on USAID<\/a>&nbsp;and other aid programs, or the new administration\u2019s utter lack of interest in how these unplanned cuts would reverberate across Africa. At the time we talked, she had been cut off from her email and from the systems she needed to process payments, unable to communicate with people on the ground. Theoretically, emergency food supplies of the sort she managed were supposed to be preserved, but all of the support around the delivery of food and money\u2014the contracts with trucking and security companies; the institutions that gather health statistics, anticipate famine, help farmers\u2014had been cut, along with their personnel. This affected everybody: the UN, other charities, even grassroots groups like the Sudanese Emergency Response Rooms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>I asked her how much the American contribution mattered. She started to answer, and then she started to cry. \u201cWe do so much, and it\u2019s all being taken away, without a moment\u2019s notice,\u201d she said after she had recovered. \u201cThere is no transition planning. There is no handover of this assistance. The U.S. has been the largest donor to Sudan since forever, and to Sudanese refugees for so long. And it\u2019s just a disaster.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>The Generals and the Politicians<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" srcset=\"https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/SDj34u3vQng4C5utKVEBWgVmbyI=\/0x0:1364x1363\/385x385\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/Sudanleaders3_head\/original.jpg 385w, https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/TCT3AabzhJW8L8iIHgDSkhCos-k=\/0x0:1364x1363\/483x482\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/Sudanleaders3_head\/original.jpg 483w, https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/H1DV-TYW7mHMux5Y64-Iz3vKsJQ=\/0x0:1364x1363\/785x784\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/Sudanleaders3_head\/original.jpg 785w, https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/Ro7z6Si4mXb8_LqBVaMtSOgTRis=\/0x0:1364x1363\/966x965\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/Sudanleaders3_head\/original.jpg 966w\" width=\"928\" height=\"927\" src=\"https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/xHBUpYa6CFU7rQ-jJQofPMnXS4w=\/0x0:1364x1363\/928x927\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/Sudanleaders3_head\/original.jpg\" alt=\"photo of man frowning in glasses\"><strong>Omar al-Bashir&nbsp;<\/strong>ran Sudan as a repressive Islamist regime for nearly 30 years, until April 2019, when\u2014after a mass democratic uprising led to several months of demonstrations and violent clashes in the streets\u2014he was removed by the military.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" srcset=\"https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/xfV9ElIrwkH_YmBayW0IR4eg3XU=\/0x0:1073x1073\/385x385\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/Sudanleaders4_head\/original.jpg 385w, https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/rLy1KQtGNnZh2mSti1spq-dXT78=\/0x0:1073x1073\/483x483\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/Sudanleaders4_head\/original.jpg 483w, https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/7Gw4Pnk7IIPR4kGxngAf5FXbHsE=\/0x0:1073x1073\/785x785\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/Sudanleaders4_head\/original.jpg 785w, https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/4FuXmZxx7PNE5uW58TFMofegzcc=\/0x0:1073x1073\/966x966\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/Sudanleaders4_head\/original.jpg 966w\" width=\"928\" height=\"928\" src=\"https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/G9vOs2B7z_HMFLL9poHhyY6yE0E=\/0x0:1073x1073\/928x928\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/Sudanleaders4_head\/original.jpg\" alt=\"black-and-white photo of balding man with mustache looking up and to right\"><strong>Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok<\/strong>ran the short-lived civilian government, backed by the military, which was meant to be a transition to Sudan\u2019s democratic future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" srcset=\"https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/x0X-h2d2Ld78rz-o6hDB6mViz5c=\/0x0:947x946\/385x385\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/Sudanleaders2_head\/original.jpg 385w, https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/mDCWvBSKdqKPurAzBEUMpPnUXxA=\/0x0:947x946\/483x482\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/Sudanleaders2_head\/original.jpg 483w, https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/xnESk9C0T53RsHE_XVbqDUOrCEQ=\/0x0:947x946\/785x784\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/Sudanleaders2_head\/original.jpg 785w\" width=\"928\" height=\"927\" src=\"https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/KxnVHeWfATDnG2bAhT5WnRXWL1E=\/0x0:947x946\/928x927\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/Sudanleaders2_head\/original.jpg\" alt=\"black-and-white photo of man with mustache in military uniform and hat saluting\"><strong>General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan,<\/strong>the leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces, or SAF. In 2021, he and his deputy, Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (see below), carried out a military coup that removed Prime Minister Hamdok. Burhan\u2019s falling-out with Dagalo precipitated the current civil war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" srcset=\"https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/iSEpQPsACiN3Fck1RRvgrrmftUE=\/0x0:1087x1087\/385x385\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/Sudanleaders1_head\/original.jpg 385w, https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/yzYqNnnIIk729pnK_vZn2U0wTtY=\/0x0:1087x1087\/483x483\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/Sudanleaders1_head\/original.jpg 483w, https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/xZSUGTGs-1Mmrg1jLneMqxtHQZU=\/0x0:1087x1087\/785x785\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/Sudanleaders1_head\/original.jpg 785w, https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/L4dr8-tp7IMrC2ZmnkMOWUpVb3E=\/0x0:1087x1087\/966x966\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/Sudanleaders1_head\/original.jpg 966w\" width=\"928\" height=\"928\" src=\"https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/1wy18B20O90aLqwwTD1I7MtiibI=\/0x0:1087x1087\/928x928\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/Sudanleaders1_head\/original.jpg\" alt=\"black-and-white photo of man wearing reading glasses and speaking\"><strong>Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti.<\/strong>&nbsp;Hemedti controls the Rapid Support Forces, or RSF, a mostly Darfurian militia whose first members were Arabic-speaking nomads known as the Janjaweed. On April 15, 2023, at the start of the civil war, the RSF attacked the SAF head\u00adquarters, the Khartoum airport, and the presidential palace.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" srcset=\"https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/vU3cLJcPyo30OOWTepp-L_Pm0GM=\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/Sudanleaders5_head2\/original.jpg\" width=\"665\" height=\"664\" src=\"https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/vU3cLJcPyo30OOWTepp-L_Pm0GM=\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/Sudanleaders5_head2\/original.jpg\" alt=\"black-and-white photo of man in suit and tie\"><strong>Khamis Abakar,<\/strong>&nbsp;the former governor of West Darfur. A member of the Masalit, the largest ethnic group in that area before the war, Abakar tried to broker peace between Masalit farmers and Arab nomads. When the civil war broke out, Abakar and the Masalit sided with the SAF. In June 2023, Abakar was kidnapped and murdered by RSF forces, though they deny responsibility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" srcset=\"https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/GZiXo1OUNFkXOTm8e8vK3BpxhXE=\/0x0:1622x1622\/385x385\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/Sudanleaders6_head\/original.jpg 385w, https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/sl1lHjajgbNmM75kKmU5UeTplKc=\/0x0:1622x1622\/483x483\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/Sudanleaders6_head\/original.jpg 483w, https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/neyfQrr5oXgMIp1SEKkGyFeUZig=\/0x0:1622x1622\/785x785\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/Sudanleaders6_head\/original.jpg 785w, https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/3lEhwWiHbmNHiCy6n1DOWgPX0RY=\/0x0:1622x1622\/966x966\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/Sudanleaders6_head\/original.jpg 966w, https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/xQras5D0Fc2X7PYPWErH8-BaA3k=\/0x0:1622x1622\/1570x1570\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/Sudanleaders6_head\/original.jpg 1570w\" width=\"928\" height=\"928\" src=\"https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/mU4nWdZdgJLE8oFHcZqQuj3I2Ns=\/0x0:1622x1622\/928x928\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/Sudanleaders6_head\/original.jpg\" alt=\"black-and-white photo of man with goatee wearing white turban\"><strong>Al Tigani Karshoum,<\/strong>&nbsp;the former deputy to Abakar, who became governor of West Darfur after Abakar\u2019s murder. Karshoum has ties to the Masalit\u2019s Arabic-speaking rivals, the tribes that made up the bulk of the Janjaweed and now the RSF. He is reported to have ordered the sacking of Masalit houses after the civil war broke out, and is under EU sanctions as a result.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>(Burhan Ozbilici \/ AP; Romuald Meigneux \/ SIPA \/ AP; Ibrahim Mohammed Ishak \/ Reuters; Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah \/ Reuters; Peter Martell \/ AFP \/ Getty; RSF account on X)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>in the past decade,&nbsp;refugees have slowly disappeared from American public debate, except when they figure as unwelcome immigrants, or as fodder for far-right memes. But they have not disappeared from the world. On the contrary,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.unhcr.org\/about-unhcr\/overview\/figures-glance#:~:text=As%20of%20the%20end%20of,are%20nearly%2043.7%20million%20refugees\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">their numbers are growing<\/a>. The wars of the 1990s produced a steady population of about 40 million refugees and displaced people. But in 2011, the numbers began to rise. In 2024, the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, at the UN, counted 123 million people around the world who were refugees, displaced, or seeking asylum.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The larger numbers reflect a deeper problem. If there are more refugees because there are more conflicts, it is also the case that there are more conflicts because international consensus has weakened. In the 1990s and early 2000s, an era of multiple peacekeeping missions, the Chinese were inclined to neutrality and the Russians were interested in cooperation. Americans, together with their European allies, enjoyed a degree of power and influence over international relations that they utterly failed to appreciate at the time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>That era is now over. The United States used UN resolutions to justify the invasion of Iraq, which helped delegitimize the UN and its procedures in the eyes of the rest of the world. Russia and China grew richer and more assertive. Now both of those countries and their network of allies\u2014from Cuba to Azerbaijan to Zimbabwe\u2014mock or undermine the language of human rights altogether. So does the MAGA wing of the American Republican Party. Meanwhile the humanitarian agencies of the UN, never models of functionality, became so \u201cbureaucratized,\u201d in the words of Alex Rondos, a former European Union special representative for the Horn of Africa, that officials \u201crefused to take risks, even to prevent deaths.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The UN Security Council became contentious, then dysfunctional. Independent UN negotiators lost their backing and clout. Finally, the Russian invasion of Ukraine pitted one security-council member directly against three others for the first time since the Cold War, ending, perhaps forever, any role for the UN Security Council as a serious place to debate matters of war and peace.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Thanks to this shift, the UN has not launched a completely new peacekeeping mission since 2014\u2014and even that one, to the Central African Republic, was possible, as Jeremy Konyndyk of Refugees International put it to me, only because it concerned a country \u201cno major power really cared that much about, strategically.\u201d The international negotiators and UN envoys who might have once persuaded all of the players to seek peace in Sudan have faded into the background. The UN was slow to react to the civilian revolution in 2019. Only after an unforgivably long time, in January 2021, did the UN secretary-general, Ant\u00f3nio Guterres, appoint a diplomat, Volker Perthes, to head the grandly named UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan. But after the military coup overthrew that government, Perthes told me, \u201cwe didn\u2019t have any transition to assist.\u201d He stayed involved, and tried to negotiate the return of the prime minister and to mediate between the two armies. But the Sudanese military accused him of partiality because he insisted on speaking to both sides, and finally declared him persona non grata.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The UN\u2019s relationship with Sudan never recovered. Guterres periodically issues declarations (\u201cWe must do more\u2014and do more now\u2014to help the people of Sudan out of this nightmare\u201d), but he hasn\u2019t been to Sudan himself. His envoy to Sudan, a former Algerian foreign minister, is&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/sudantribune.com\/article301980\/?__cf_chl_tk=PtTwavqODRVNn.7xWnTXRHBBmJZQceowL.shWQY0FOA-1751039097-1.0.1.1-bKxVclDZj0tHnK.nUexzjpLRxLIVMeo433ChzLxylw0\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">widely criticized for perceived bias<\/a>, because the UN, in practice, treats the SAF as the legitimate government. UN staff in Sudan&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/features\/2025\/3\/5\/sudanese-starve-as-soup-kitchens-close-down-and-warring-parties-block-aid\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">repeatedly point to the bureaucratic obstacles<\/a>&nbsp;all combatants create to hamper the distribution of aid. In a briefing to the UN Security Council, Christopher Lockyear, the head of Doctors Without Borders, said that the \u201cdelivery of humanitarian assistance in Sudan remains exceedingly and, in some cases, deliberately complex.\u201d He also warned that both sides were using aid, and aid agencies, as a source of legitimacy. One former UN diplomat told me, more bluntly, that the Sudanese army was \u201cusing starvation as a weapon of war.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>That kind of criticism comes from real frustration. But it doesn\u2019t build warm feelings. The Sudanese army\u2019s finance minister, Gibril Ibrahim, told me that the \u201cinternational community\u201d is largely irrelevant, and that \u201cmainly Gulf countries\u201d are providing help for victims of the conflict. Though this was untrue\u2014as of last year, hundreds of millions of American dollars were still flowing to Sudan\u2014the comment was revealing. In practice, Sudan\u2019s leaders, on all sides of the conflict, have already turned away from the U.S., the UN, and international aid and international law, because in their world, these things mean nothing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>we crossed over&nbsp;the border into Sudan near the Chadian city of Adr\u00e9, a place literally built on shifting sand. Devoid of trees, grass, and water, Adr\u00e9 now hosts more than 200,000 Sudanese refugees. I visited its main camp\u2014a real one, not a converted school\u2014which looks from the outside like a fortified prison. The border itself is now a noisy no-man\u2019s-land, crowded with transport trucks, tiny wagons, cars, pickup trucks, camels, and donkeys. If gold or weapons were wrapped in someone\u2019s blanket or hidden beneath the seats of a van, no one would know. I encountered no customs officials or formal border posts as I crossed into Sudan from Chad, because there isn\u2019t a proper government on the Sudanese side.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The RSF maintains order in West Darfur (or does for the moment). Men with machine guns patrol the markets. Pickup trucks carrying more soldiers park in front of the dilapidated local administration buildings. But the men who control the city can\u2019t provide much else. One might call West Darfur a libertarian paradise: There is no income tax, no government, no regulations\u2014but also not many roads, hospitals, or schools.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/Dj2A2Fe4rewAiqSZaxJ-KEqvBOU=\/0x0:3000x2000\/1600x1067\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/20250503_CHAD_006383_KBG_low\/original.jpg\" alt=\"photo of interior of back of transport truck filled with women wearing brightly colored and patterned headscarves and children of all ages, with child in foreground pressing hand to face covering his eyes\"\/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Lynsey Addario for&nbsp;<em>The Atlantic<\/em>Sudanese refugees are relocated from a camp outside Al-Fashir, in Darfur, to the camp in Tin\u00e9, Chad, in early May, after the RSF attacked Al-Fashir. The RSF killed dozens of civilians and set homes and humanitarian offices on fire, forcing more than 400,000 people to flee the camp.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>I traveled from Adr\u00e9 to El Geneina, a city in West Darfur, with an escort who had been assigned to us by the RSF. He was studying in Dubai and wore sneakers and neat khakis instead of a jalabiya and turban. But he got us through every one of the dozens of checkpoints we encountered by calling out greetings to the men with guns, offering an embrace, and sometimes stopping to chat, perhaps about relatives or mutual friends. On the last day of our trip, he told me that he hoped someday to go to California, to learn about California, and then to come home and make Darfur more like California.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Others also told us they aspired to the things that the liberal world used to stand for. Among them was Al Tigani Karshoum, the current governor of West Darfur, who had formerly served as the deputy to the previous governor, Khamis Abakar. The two men were appointed in the years following&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/sudantribune.com\/article67774\/\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">a government agreement to broker peace and share power<\/a>. Abakar was a member of the Masalit tribe, which before the war was the largest ethnic group in El Geneina. Karshoum\u2019s links are to the Masalit\u2019s Arabic-speaking rivals, the tribes that comprised the bulk of the Janjaweed and now the RSF.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The competition between the Masalit and the Arabs is old, although it wasn\u2019t always lethal. The Masalit, along with other tribes, were farmers; the Arabs were nomads, camel herders. Although they&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.thenewhumanitarian.org\/news-feature\/2023\/02\/08\/local-peace-controversy-Sudan-Darfur-Hemedti\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">think of themselves as ethnically different<\/a>, they coexisted and even intermarried in Darfur for decades, until&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/climate-diplomacy.org\/case-studies\/droughts-migration-and-communal-conflicts-darfur\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">climate change dried up the land and made the arable parts scarce<\/a>. Following a major drought and famine in 1984\u201385, everyone began to buy weapons. \u201cA herd of a thousand camels represents more than a million dollars on the hoof,\u201d the historian Alex de Waal wrote in 2004. \u201cOnly the most naive herd-owner would not buy automatic rifles.\u201d This conflict was then accelerated by the Bashir government in Khartoum, which gave the nomads more weapons and empowered them, as the Janjaweed, to repress their neighbors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The current civil war has reignited and amplified this old rivalry, along with many other Sudanese rivalries, as it enabled both sides to acquire sophisticated weapons from around the world. Governor Abakar and the Masalit sided with the Sudanese Armed Forces, which had tanks and airplanes. The RSF and the nomadic Arabs brought in drones, howitzers, multiple-rocket launchers, and other weapons from abroad. They used their arsenal to&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/investigates\/special-report\/sudan-politics-darfur-violence\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">unleash a wave of violence<\/a>&nbsp;on the Masalit neighborhoods of El Geneina, according to a UN report, killing 10,000 to 15,000 people. Abakar himself was kidnapped and then murdered.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Under a tent outside the sprawling refugee camp in Adr\u00e9, Darassalam, a teacher and headmistress of a school, told me that Arab soldiers had come to her neighborhood in El Geneina and ordered her to go to Chad. They told her they wanted to \u201cclean the town of black skins.\u201d The RSF, which she called the Janjaweed, killed people in front of her. \u201cI saw raped women and men in front of me, beaten people in front of me.\u201d In 2023, other Masalit exiles told Reuters they had seen Karshoum himself riding in pickup trucks, giving orders to sack houses. As a result of these and other accounts,&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/articles\/c1755j8788go\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">which he denies<\/a>, Karshoum is under EU sanctions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Karshoum told me a different story. He claimed, as did several others, that the Masalit and the SAF began the conflict. He expressed anguish about what had happened in El Geneina. After the murder of Abakar, he had been too distraught to continue his duties, he told me. Abakar, he said, was \u201cmy friend.\u201d A council of elders, including several dozen tribal and religious leaders, came to his house and asked him to stay on. At first, he told me, he refused. Finally he agreed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>I don\u2019t know whether what Karshoum told me was true. But he wanted me to understand that he had real civil-society support, that he himself was a civilian, and that he wanted to build a civilian government, one that represented all the ethnic groups in the region. He told me that there should be an independent investigation into the events that unfolded in the spring of 2023 (although the UN has already conducted one). He assured me that the Masalit were returning home to Sudan, and encouraged me to come and witness a local meeting of Masalit and other tribes, due to take place in another town a few hours\u2019 drive away.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The event didn\u2019t happen, or maybe I wasn\u2019t wanted; the reason for the canceled invitation was never clear. But I did meet the reconciliation committee that supported Karshoum. About a dozen of the committee members gathered in a single bare room and introduced themselves, each one naming his tribe or clan, including a man who introduced himself as a Masalit. We also met Abdulbaqi Ali Hussein Ahmed, a lawyer and the chairman of the local constituent assembly. Solemnly, he showed me the old council chamber, with its worn tiles, watermarked walls, and shuttered windows, and promised it would someday be used again, by all of the ethnic groups in the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Outside Sudan, the RSF also wants to be seen as a force for democracy, not as a rapacious militia engaged in ethnic cleansing. This past spring, together with allied militias, a group of RSF leaders announced plans to form a Government of Peace and Unity, and to issue passports and currency. All of these efforts evoke a lot of scorn. In Adr\u00e9, Asaad Bahr Al-Din, the brother of the sultan of the Masalit, told us that although some Masalit might return to El Geneina to trade or collect belongings, few were returning for good. \u201cThere is discrimination,\u201d he told us. \u201cNo freedom.\u201d Perceived enemies of the RSF were still intimidated, sometimes beaten, even just for looking insufficiently sad upon hearing the news of RSF battlefield defeats. In Port Sudan, I asked the finance minister, a Darfuri himself, what he thought of the RSF\u2019s Government of Peace and Unity, and he dismissed it immediately. \u201cThey know nothing about democracy. Actually, they have been used by others to talk about democracy.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>I heard the use of the word&nbsp;<em>democracy<\/em>&nbsp;differently. Think back, again, to the decades that followed the sack of Rome. Long after the empire was too weak to exert real power, Latin remained the language of scholarship, of the Church, of universal communication. In much of the world, the terms&nbsp;<em>democracy<\/em>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<em>civil society<\/em>&nbsp;now function in the same way: They signify that the user aspires to something better\u2014to legitimacy, to statehood. Warlords can rule by brute force for a time, but eventually they want recognition, acceptance, maybe statehood and UN membership.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The path to all of those things still runs through international law, even in a world where international law is scorned, dismissed, and ignored by the countries that invented it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>one day toward&nbsp;the end of our stay in El Geneina, we planned to leave early to travel to Zalingei, another town about 100 miles to the east, and to return the same day. The desert road between the two cities is one of the best in Darfur, which simply means that most of it is paved. Even so, the route requires a detour across a dried riverbed to avoid a bombed-out bridge, passes through more than a dozen RSF checkpoints, and runs through a region without cellphone connection and only loose RSF control. A daytime drive was said to be safe, but everyone advised us to get home before dark: Not only are there no taxes and no government regulations in Darfur, but there are also no highway police, no rescue services. No one will come help you if anything goes wrong.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/UAUTW8XPJ1ObC9hDJ7Syr3XUF7k=\/0x0:3000x2000\/928x619\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/20250501_CHAD_002526_KBG_low\/original.jpg\" alt=\"photo of woman from shoulders down wrapped in red shawl and holding emaciated baby in her lap, sitting on brightly patterned blanket\"\/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Lynsey Addario for&nbsp;<em>The Atlantic<\/em>At the Iriba district hospital in northeastern Chad, Taiba Adnan Suliman holds Hussein, one of her five-month-old twins, who is severely malnourished. Taiba and her seven children walked for 20 days from Al-Fashir.<strong>&nbsp;<\/strong><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>The day went badly. We lost time in the morning, waiting for permission from the RSF to leave the city by car. We arrived very late for an appointment at a hospital, and the physicians we had planned to meet had left for lunch. We were even later for our next meeting, and squeezed the one after that into just a few minutes. Then, right after we finally got back into the car and prepared to head out of the city, our driver, who had come with us from Chad and wasn\u2019t very communicative, abruptly announced that he was out of gas. There are no gas stations in Zalingei, so we went to a street market and filled the tank out of big plastic containers. By the time this tedious operation was concluded, it was late afternoon.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>We headed out of town. Then, just as the sun was setting, the day devolved into a scene from a bad movie. The car started shaking, then slowed down. We had a flat tire. We got out of the car to change it. The spare tire was broken. Our guide, who had been relaxed and chatty throughout the previous difficulties, suddenly changed his tone. He barked orders at the driver, telling him to keep moving, despite the flat tire: We had to get to a checkpoint. It wasn\u2019t safe to be stuck in the middle of the desert in the dark.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Just then, we saw a car approaching in the distance\u2014unusual for this time of day. Our driver, our translator, and our guide stayed tense and silent, waiting to see who it would be. The car was a pickup truck; the passengers were men in flowing robes and turbans, carrying AK-47s, some riding in the cabin, some standing in the back.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The truck slowed down. Our guide smiled widely and held out his arms. He called out a name. One of the passengers, wearing a robin\u2019s-egg-blue jalabiya and a camouflage turban, jumped off the truck and rushed to embrace him. It was his brother-in-law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>We were rescued. The brother-in-law and his comrades had a Starlink dish mounted on the hood of their pickup truck, so we had Wi-Fi. They gave us their functional spare tire, and escorted us back to El Geneina in the dark. In a lawless world\u2014in a place run by militias, clans, and families\u2014you are perfectly safe as long as your relatives are the ones in charge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>couple of days&nbsp;after we left Khartoum, the Sudanese army recaptured the presidential palace, the symbolic seat of power in the capital. Soldiers&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/world\/2025\/03\/21\/sudan-war-khartoum-military-republican-palace\/\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">filmed themselves<\/a>&nbsp;shouting triumphant slogans and waving rifles in front of broken windows. Sudanese military officials posted reams of praise on social media. In Port Sudan, several people predicted confidently that the war would soon end, perhaps as early as April, because the Sudanese army would now quickly reconquer the rest of the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>That same day, Colonel Ibrahim, the earnest military-liaison officer who\u2019d helped us because he didn\u2019t want Sudan to become a \u201cforgotten war,\u201d was killed in a drone strike, together with a team of Sudanese television journalists. The RSF must have targeted them, to spoil what would have been newsworthy film and photographs. Over tea that evening in the garden of our hotel in Port Sudan, a senior Sudanese-military officer, the scion of a family with a long tradition in the government and army, told us in confidence that he disagreed with the official optimism. The war would not end soon. His own family, whose members found themselves on different sides of the conflict, bitterly divided, were still \u201celecting by their legs\u201d to leave the country, traveling to Egypt, or Abu Dhabi, or beyond.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Some weeks later, the RSF began using drones to hit Port Sudan, including the hotel with the garden where we\u2019d had tea. The Sudanese-military leaders accused the Emiratis of coordinating the strike, and finally cut all ties with Abu Dhabi. The UN suspended flights into Port Sudan. Some of the diplomats who remained in Port Sudan also, I was told, began to contemplate leaving.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>As a result of these beliefs, wd Zaineb has spent a lot of his life in hiding. He hid first from the Bashir regime. After the coup, he hid from the military dictatorship. On the first day of the war, he nevertheless went immediately to al-Nau, which was then in the middle of the conflict zone, to see what he could do to help injured civilians. Together with dozens and eventually&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/time.com\/7204654\/sudan-humanitarianism-crisis-err-aid\/\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">hundreds of other activists across the country, on both sides of the conflict<\/a>, wd Zaineb helped build the Emergency Response Rooms, raising money, at first from diaspora Sudanese, to provide people with the communal kitchens I saw all over the country, along with medical care and other help. The Emergency Response Rooms, known as the ERR movement\u2014sooner or later, every Sudanese group becomes known by its acronym\u2014eventually built shared fundraising platforms that are capable of raising money around the world and distributing aid around the country. \u201cWe did all of this on our own,\u201d wd Zaineb told me, \u201cas revolutionaries, without any support from the government.\u201d That kind of independence generates hostility from both the RSF and the Sudanese military, who have repressed ERR volunteers. Alsanosi Adam, a member of the ERR communications team, based in Kenya, advised me to be careful meeting volunteers on the ground, because the interaction might attract unwanted attention from the authorities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>But wd Zaineb wanted to meet, and eventually we arranged to do so a second time, this time behind a water tank where petitioners couldn\u2019t immediately find him. I asked him to explain the connection between this volunteer work and his political activism, and he told me that they are the same thing. The war, he said, is run by people who want to destroy, so he tries to do the opposite: to build. He pointed at the huddle of people who were already gathering a few feet away, waiting for him. \u201cHim, he\u2019s like my father. Her, she\u2019s like my mother. All these people need help, so I came to help. I stay here sometimes for 10 hours a day.\u201d There aren\u2019t enough ambulances, so he and his network of volunteers also help people get to the hospital after a bombing raid, assist the families of the injured, even bury the dead.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The hospital authorities are wary of wd Zaineb\u2014he\u2019s not a physician; medications can interact badly with one another. Their doctors and nurses also do heroic work, providing emergency help to victims of the war. Maybe his politics make them nervous too. Still, they tolerate wd Zaineb standing in the courtyard. Without him, the small mob of sick people would not have access to any medication at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/cdn.theatlantic.com\/thumbor\/4rI4Vlfe5kpm3bdH9Mc3zDq20dc=\/0x0:3000x2000\/928x619\/media\/img\/posts\/2025\/08\/20250318_08645_low\/original.jpg\" alt=\"photo at dusk of two rows of men praying on wide dirt median of a street lined with shops and cars\"\/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Lynsey Addario for<em>&nbsp;The Atlantic<\/em>After breaking their fast in the evening during Ramadan, Sudanese men pray on a median strip in Omdurman.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p>Many others share his views. During that rushed, truncated day in Zalingei, we did have one memorable meeting, with a group of students and professionals\u2014among them a physician, a teacher, and an environmental engineer\u2014who had, during the two years of war, collectively created 45 Emergency Response Rooms in Central Darfur, staffed by more than 800 volunteers. Many had lost their job when universities, hospitals, and government offices were shelled or shut down, but they still thought it important to \u201cgive something to the community,\u201d as one of them told me. Like wd Zaineb, they wanted to build, they told me, not destroy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Asked about motivations, one used the term&nbsp;<em>nafeer<\/em>, which refers to \u201ccommunal labor\u201d or \u201ccommunal work.\u201d Another mentioned&nbsp;<em>takiya<\/em>, when \u201cpeople collect their food together and to eat together, to share it, if somebody doesn\u2019t have food for supper or dinner.\u201d While traveling in Sudan during Ramadan, I saw many instances of men far from home\u2014drivers, workers, or indeed our translators\u2014joining the communal prayers and meals served on the street when the fast is broken at sundown.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>It\u2019s easy, from a great distance, to be cynical about or dismissive of the prospects for good government in Sudan, but these are the same kinds of traditions that have become the foundation for more democratic, less violent political systems in other places.&nbsp;<em>Nafeer<\/em>&nbsp;reminded me of&nbsp;<em>toloka<\/em>, an old Slavic word I heard used to explain the roots of the volunteer movement in Ukraine.&nbsp;<em>Takiya<\/em>&nbsp;sounds like the community barn-raisings of 19th-century rural America. The communal activists who draw on these old ideas do so not because of a foreign influence campaign, or because they have read John Locke or James Madison, or because, like the inhabitants of medieval Europe, they want to turn the clock back to a different era. They do so because their experience with autocracy, violence, and nihilism pushes them to want democracy, civilian government, and a system of power-sharing that would include all the people and all the tribes of Sudan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>On both of my trips to Sudan, I traveled out via Dubai, and each time it felt like a scene from a children\u2019s book, where one of the characters walks through a mirror or a wardrobe and emerges in a completely different universe. In Sudan, some people have nothing except a bowl of bean soup once a day. In the Dubai airport, the Chanel store is open all night, AirPods can be purchased for the flight home, and multiple juice bars serve crushed tropical fruits.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>But despite the illusion of separation, those universes are connected, and the same forces that have destroyed Sudan are coming for other countries too. Violence inspired and fueled by multiple outsiders has already destroyed Syria, Libya, and Yemen, and is spreading in Chad, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and beyond. Greed, nihilism, and transactionalism are reshaping the politics of the rich world too. As old rules and norms fall away, they are not replaced by a new structure. They are replaced by nothing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p><em><small>This article appears in the&nbsp;<\/small><\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/www.theatlantic.com\/magazine\/toc\/2025\/09\/\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><em><small>September 2025<\/small><\/em><\/a><em><small>&nbsp;print edition with the headline \u201cThis Is What the End of the Liberal World Order Looks Like.\u201d<\/small><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<h3 class=\"wp-block-heading\">ABOUT THE AUTHOR<\/h3>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.theatlantic.com\/author\/anne-applebaum\/\"><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.theatlantic.com\/author\/anne-applebaum\/\">Anne Applebaum<\/a>Follow<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.theatlantic.com\/author\/anne-applebaum\/\">Anne Applebaum<\/a>&nbsp;is a staff writer at&nbsp;<em>The Atlantic<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.theatlantic.com\/magazine\/toc\/2025\/09\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\"><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Back to News Lynsey Addario for&nbsp;The Atlantic Sudanese refugees are relocated from a camp outside Al-Fashir, in Darfur, to the camp in Tin\u00e9, Chad, in early May, after the RSF attacked Al-Fashir. The RSF killed dozens of civilians and set homes and humanitarian offices on fire, forcing more than 400,000 people to flee the camp. [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1001004,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[55,54],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/worldcampaign.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16634"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/worldcampaign.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/worldcampaign.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/worldcampaign.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1001004"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/worldcampaign.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=16634"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/worldcampaign.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16634\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":17241,"href":"https:\/\/worldcampaign.net\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/16634\/revisions\/17241"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/worldcampaign.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=16634"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/worldcampaign.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=16634"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/worldcampaign.net\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=16634"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}