By Rick Gladstone and Maggie Haberman, June 20, 2018<\/p>\n
At least twice this year, the Syrian military fired Iranian-made artillery shells filled with a chlorine-like substance that oozed poison slowly, giving victims just a few minutes to escape.<\/p>\n
In another attack, Syrian forces dropped a chemical bomb on the top-floor balcony of an apartment building, killing 49 people, including 11 children. Their skin turned blue.<\/p>\n
These details and others blaming Syria for atrocities in eastern Ghouta, a suburb of Damascus, were uncovered by a United Nations commission investigating and documenting possible war crimes in the seven-year-old conflict. But when the commission issued a report on Wednesday, the details were omitted.<\/p>\n
Seven pages that had been in an earlier draft, provided to The New York Times, were summarized in two paragraphs in the final document.<\/p>\n
The commission\u2019s report examined how the government of President Bashar al-Assad recaptured eastern Ghouta, the rebel stronghold near the capital, in the first four months of 2018. Mr. Assad\u2019s forces laid siege to the area, using bombardments, mass starvation and chemical weapons.<\/p>\n
The materials in the leaked draft paint a far more frightening picture of chemical weapons use in eastern Ghouta than had been previously reported. And they assert without qualification that Syrian forces and their allies were responsible, rebutting repeated denials by Mr. Assad\u2019s government and his backers in Russia and Iran.<\/p>\n
A member of the commission explained the omissions, saying that many of the details in the early draft needed additional corroboration or clarification and might be included in another report, perhaps by September. There was no outside pressure to withhold the information, said the member, Hanny Megally, an Egyptian human rights lawyer.<\/p>\n
\u201cWe thought we need to do some more work on this, it\u2019s an ongoing investigation,\u201d Mr. Megally said. \u201cSo we thought, let\u2019s keep it short.\u201d<\/p>\n
But the conclusions in the omitted information seemed unambiguous.<\/p>\n
The leaked draft stated:<\/p>\n
\n\u201cIn one of the most grim patterns of attack documented during the period under review, Government forces and\/or affiliated militias continued to use chemical weapons in densely populated civilian areas throughout eastern Ghouta.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
In meticulous detail, the draft enumerated six chemical weapons assaults on civilians from January through April 7, the date of the deadliest assault. In what appeared to be a first, it implicated Iranian-supplied weaponry.<\/p>\n
In attacks on Jan. 13, Jan. 22 and Feb. 1, the draft said, government forces fired chemical agents, \u201cmost probably chlorine,\u201d into a residential part of eastern Ghouta\u2019s Douma neighborhood, near a sports stadium, roughly 800 yards from the front lines, between 5 a.m. and 6:30 a.m.<\/p>\n
Some witnesses described a \u201cslow-acting agent\u201d that smelled like chlorine, the draft said, and they had sufficient time \u201cto rouse the victims, obtain wet cloths to serve as makeshift face masks, and evacuate the affected areas.\u201d<\/p>\n
In the Jan. 22 and Feb. 1 attacks, the draft said, the commission had evidence identifying the bomb delivery devices as surface-to-surface industrially produced Iranian artillery rockets, \u201conly known to have been used by Government forces and, rarely, affiliated militias.\u201d<\/p>\n
\n\u201cIn relation to the munitions used on 22 January and 1 February, the Commission obtained and assessed material evidence including metadata analysis, and identified a surface-to-surface craft-produced rocket (IRAM). While IRAMs have been employed by a range of actors across Syria, the particular design of observed during these two attacks is only known to have been used by Government forces and rarely, affiliated militias. Specifically, IRAMs documented were built around industrially-produced Iranian artillery rockets known to have been supplied to Syrian Government forces.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
The draft said that the eastern Ghouta attacks had followed \u201ca pattern previously documented by the Commission concerning the use of chemical weapons by Government forces,\u201d and that none of them had suggested \u201cthe involvement of armed groups.\u201d<\/p>\n
Thirty-one people, including 11 children, were sickened in the first three attacks, but none died. Two other episodes of possible chlorine use, on Feb. 25 and March 7, caused more extensive casualties, killing two children, including an infant, and injuring 18 civilians.<\/p>\n
The worst was yet to come, following the collapse of negotiations between Russian military officials and an insurgent group, Jaish al-Islam, to evacuate the Douma neighborhood and end the siege. On April 7, the draft said, an improvised explosive delivered from the air hit a multistory residential building roughly 200 yards from the Rif Damascus Hospital, the last functioning hospital in Douma.<\/p>\n
The draft described the explosive as a \u201csingle industrial gas cylinder\u201d with fins that struck the top-floor balcony and appeared to have \u201crapidly released large amounts of a substance into the interior space of the residential apartment building.\u201d<\/p>\n
\n\u201cPositions and physical symptoms displayed by victims of the attack support witness claims that the agent acted rapidly,\u201d the draft stated, \u201cand likely indicate that a high concentration of the chemical sank downwards.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
Based on witness statements and \u201cmaterial evidence received and analyzed by the Commission,\u201d the draft stated, the dead showed \u201can array of symptoms consistent with exposure to a choking agent, including signs of foaming at the mouth and nose, blue skin indicating impaired blood circulation, meiosis (constriction of the pupils), as well as some cases of dilated (wide open) pupils.\u201d<\/p>\n
\n\u201cStatements and material evidence received and analysed by the Commission in relation to the deceased within the apartment building revealed an array of symptoms consistent with exposure to a choking agent, including signs of foaming at the mouth and nose, blue skin indicating impaired blood circulation, meiosis (constriction of the pupils), as well as some cases of dilated (wide open) pupils. Numerous victims unable to flee the building collapsed shortly after exposure.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
\n\nMr. Megally declined to go into detail over why such information was withheld from the report published on Wednesday. But he said that with the April 7 attack in particular, more information was needed, including precisely what killed the 49 people.<\/p>\n
\n\u201cIf we\u2019re not sure what the cause of death was, we may be looking in the wrong place,\u201d he said. \u201cIt\u2019s better we finish the investigation, rather than release it in dribs and drabs.\u201d<\/p>\n
The official version of the report was far more cautious about the chemical weapons incidents in question. In two attacks, for example, the report said the commission was \u201cunable to obtain sufficient material evidence to conclusively identify the weapons delivery systems.\u201d<\/p>\n
While the circumstances in the April 7 attack were \u201clargely consistent with the use of chlorine,\u201d it said, the symptoms were more consistent with the use of \u201canother chemical agent, most likely a nerve gas.\u201d<\/p>\n
The official version also condemned rebel forces for indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas.<\/p>\n
The commission, which has been compiling evidence of atrocities in the Syria conflict since shortly after the war began in 2011, has developed an extensive array of ways to gather information, even though Mr. Assad has not allowed its investigators into the country. Led by Paulo S\u00e9rgio Pinheiro, a Brazilian diplomat and rights activist, the commission has even compiled a confidential list of Syrian officials and others who may be held accountable in a court some day<\/a>.<\/p>\n
The earlier draft of its report on eastern Ghouta was shared by a person close to the commission, who had been consulted on the report and who declined to be identified.<\/p>\n
The leak suggested some internal dissension in the commission about the strength of its evidence concerning the Syrian government\u2019s use of chemical weapons in eastern Ghouta. It was also possible that the commission wanted to exercise caution ahead of an expected report on the April 7 attack in Douma by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which sent investigators to the site.<\/p>\n
Chemical weapons are banned by an international treaty that Mr. Assad signed under pressure in 2013, when his government was first accused of having used chemical weapons in the conflict \u2014 also in eastern Ghouta.<\/p>\n
\n\nThe April 7 attack in Douma caused widespread international fury, particularly because many victims appeared to have been children shown gagging and choking, based on videos disseminated by witnesses and activists. The attack drew retaliatory missile attacks and airstrikes<\/a> by Britain, France and the United States.<\/p>\n
Mr. Assad\u2019s government, backed by Russia and Iran, sought to cast doubt about the Douma attack, suggesting it had been faked or carried out by insurgents.<\/p>\n
The Syrian government and its allies took control of eastern Ghouta two months ago after imposing what the commission\u2019s report described as \u201cthe longest siege in modern history,\u201d displacing more than 140,000 people from their homes<\/a> and unleashing bombardments<\/a> that destroyed hospitals, markets and schools, and forced residents to live in cellars and basements.<\/p>\n
Those bombardments \u2014 mainly airstrikes by Syrian and Russian planes \u2014 killed 1,100 civilians and injured 4,000 others in a period of less than a month from Feb. 18, the commission said in its report, which is to be delivered to the United Nations Human Rights Council next week.<\/p>\n
Tens of thousands of those who fled are still being held unlawfully by the government, which pursued a policy of blanket internment that the panel called \u201creprehensible.\u201d<\/p>\n
Sieges are permitted under international humanitarian law. But, in a departure from established practice, the panel said it considered the way pro-government forces had conducted the siege of eastern Ghouta unlawful.<\/p>\n
\u201cCertain acts perpetrated by pro-government forces during the siege laid to eastern Ghouta, including the deliberate starvation of the civilian population as a method of warfare, amount to the crime against humanity of inhumane acts, causing serious mental and physical suffering,\u201d the panel concluded.<\/p>\n
Read the Segment of the United Nations Commission Draft Report<\/h2>\n
A leaked portion of an early draft of the United Nations commission report on the investigation into atrocities committed during the Syrian military\u2019s successful siege of eastern Ghouta:<\/p>\n
C. Use of Prohibited weapons<\/strong><\/p>\n
51. In one of the most grim patterns of attack<\/p>\n
documented during the period under review,<\/p>\n
Government forces and\/or affiliated militias<\/p>\n
continued to use chemical weapons in densely<\/p>\n
populated civilian areas throughout eastern<\/p>\n
Ghouta. The use of chemical agents, most<\/p>\n
probably chlorine, was carried out by improvised<\/p>\n
roeket\u00bbassisted munitions (lRAMs), and, in one<\/p>\n
instance, air\u2014delivered munitions.<\/p>\n
A, January to March<\/strong><\/p>\n
52. For example, Government forces and\/or<\/p>\n
affiliated militias launched a series of ground<\/p>\n
attacks in Douma on 13 and 22 January, and 1<\/p>\n
February. The attacked locations were near the<\/p>\n
Douma stadium, in Karm al\u00bbRasas, 150 metres<\/p>\n
from Harasta and some 800 metres from the<\/p>\n
Closest frontline \u2014 an area described by victims and<\/p>\n
witnesses as a residential neighbourhood inhabited<\/p>\n
by civilians with no military presence. All three<\/p>\n
attacks were carried out between approximately<\/p>\n
5:00 and 6:30am. The first attack, on 13 January,<\/p>\n
injured five children, one woman, and one man.<\/p>\n
The second, on 22 January, injured six children,<\/p>\n
seven women, and eight men. The third attack, on<\/p>\n
1 February, injured three women.<\/p>\n
53. In all three incidents, victims and witnesses<\/p>\n
including treating medical staff described<\/p>\n
strikingly similar symptoms, including, but not<\/p>\n
limited to: respiratory distress, coughing, burning<\/p>\n
eyes, throat irritation. and nausea. Witnesses<\/p>\n
consistently recalled the distinctive smell of<\/p>\n
chlorine at the affected sites, as well as on the<\/p>\n
victims\u2019 clothing. Some witnesses described a<\/p>\n
scent similar to bleach and household detergents,<\/p>\n
though more pungent.<\/p>\n
54. Witnesses further described a slow-acting<\/p>\n
agent: upon recognising the smell of chlorine on<\/p>\n
xx Jan\/Feb, one witness recalled how s\/he and<\/p>\n
others had sufficient time to rouse the victims,<\/p>\n
obtain wet cloths to serve as makeshift facemasks,<\/p>\n
and evacuate the affected areas. In all incidents,<\/p>\n
first responders effectively treated symptoms with<\/p>\n
oxygen and bronchodilators (Lag, Salbutamol). the<\/p>\n
use ofwhich is broadly consistent with exposure to<\/p>\n
chlorine.<\/p>\n
55. In relation to the munitions used on 22<\/p>\n
January and 1 February, the Commission obtained<\/p>\n
and assessed material evidence including metadata<\/p>\n
analysis, and identified a surface-to-surfaee, craftproduced<\/p>\n
rocket (IRAM). While IRAMs have been<\/p>\n
employed by a range of actors across Syria, the<\/p>\n
particular design observed during these two attacks<\/p>\n
is only known to have been used by Government<\/p>\n
forces and, rarely, affiliated militias. Specifically,<\/p>\n
IRAMS documented were built around<\/p>\n
industrially\u2014produced Iranian artillery rockets<\/p>\n
known to have been supplied to Syrian<\/p>\n
Govcmment forces. The particular examples<\/p>\n
documented bear markings indicating they were<\/p>\n
produced in 2016, and design features consistent<\/p>\n
with lRAMs employed by Syrian Government<\/p>\n
forces since at least late 2012.<\/p>\n
56. The foregoing attacks follow a pattern<\/p>\n
previously documented by the Commission<\/p>\n
concerning the use of chemical weapons by<\/p>\n
Govemment forces, a trend consistently observed<\/p>\n
between 2014 and 2017. In none of the foregoing<\/p>\n
incidents reviewed did the information gathered<\/p>\n
suggest the involvement of armed groups. There<\/p>\n
are therefore reasonable grounds to believe that<\/p>\n
Government forces and\/or affiliated militias<\/p>\n
launched lRAMs carrying a chlorine payload in<\/p>\n
Douma on 13 January, 22 January, and 1 February.<\/p>\n
57. Further evidence on the possible use of<\/p>\n
chlorine was received in relation to two other<\/p>\n
incidents, the first having uccurred in al-<\/p>\n
Shayt\u2018ouniya (middle sector) on 25 February at<\/p>\n
approximately 6:30pm. The attack killed a m\/f<\/p>\n
infant and a four\u2014year\u2014old b\/g, and injured another<\/p>\n
18 civilians. A similar incident occurred on 7<\/p>\n
March at approximately 10:00p.m., in an area<\/p>\n
between Saqba and l\u2014lammouriyeh (middle sector).<\/p>\n
The latter attack injured at least 27 individuals. In<\/p>\n
both incidents, victims and witnesses including<\/p>\n
treating medical staff described symptoms similar<\/p>\n
to those mentioned above (para. xx). as well as<\/p>\n
similar treatment methods (para. xx). Witnesses<\/p>\n
further canststently recognised the smell of<\/p>\n
chlorine. In both cases, however. the Commission<\/p>\n
was unable to obtain sufficient material evidence<\/p>\n
to conclusively identify the weapons delivery<\/p>\n
systems.<\/p>\n
B. April<\/strong><\/p>\n
53. Following the collapse of ceasefire<\/p>\n
negotiations between Jaysh al-lslam and the<\/p>\n
Russian Federation to evacuate Douma in early<\/p>\n
April, pro-Government forces launched a series of<\/p>\n
attacks on the last remaining opposition redoubt on<\/p>\n
5, 6, and 7 April (paras. xx-xx). Over the course of<\/p>\n
the day on 7 April, numernus aerial attacks struck<\/p>\n
various residential areas. At around 7:30pm.. an<\/p>\n
improvised air-delivered munitien was air-dropped<\/p>\n
on a residential building, killing at least 49<\/p>\n
individuals. and injuring up to 650 hundred others.<\/p>\n
The injuries sustained ranged in severity, with<\/p>\n
some victims having been exposed to a chemical<\/p>\n
agent.<\/p>\n
59. The attack struck a multi\u2014storey residential<\/p>\n
apartment building located approximately 100<\/p>\n
metres southwest of Shohada square, close to thc<\/p>\n
al-Nuamaan mosque. The residential building was<\/p>\n
situated approximately 200 meters from the Rit\u2018<\/p>\n
Damascus Hospital (based in the tanner al-Zeera<\/p>\n
building) which, at the time, had moved must ofils<\/p>\n
operations underground and was the last<\/p>\n
functioning hospital in Dnuma. In addition. the<\/p>\n
underground hospital was serving as a makeshift<\/p>\n
Shelter for up to 1,000 individuals. The affected<\/p>\n
residential building is located at the entrance ofa<\/p>\n
tunnel which directly connected to the hospital and<\/p>\n
functioned as an entry point for ambulances. The<\/p>\n
impact site was localcd in a dcnscly\u00bbpopulated<\/p>\n
residential neighbourhood.<\/p>\n
60. The improvised munition employed was<\/p>\n
based around a single industrial gas cylinder fitted<\/p>\n
to a metal frame or “cradle,” with affixed fins and<\/p>\n
wheel assemblies. which tore free from its cradle<\/p>\n
during impact. The munition struck a top-floor<\/p>\n
balcony on the residential building and damaged<\/p>\n
the concrete structure, leaving the nose of the<\/p>\n
weapon positioned directly abuve a hole into the<\/p>\n
room below. Remnants of these modifications,<\/p>\n
including distinctive wheel assemblies, are clearly<\/p>\n
visible in material evidence received and analysed<\/p>\n
by the Commission.<\/p>\n
61. The interior ceilings of the residential<\/p>\n
building here structural damage consistent with the<\/p>\n
munition being air-delivered. One witness saw a<\/p>\n
yellow-green cloud emitting from a bomb in flight<\/p>\n
falling towards the building. Remnants of the<\/p>\n
cylinder also displayed signs of impact damage<\/p>\n
and bore markings in a grid pattern 7 which appear<\/p>\n
to match those of the wire mesh fencing present at<\/p>\n
the impact site, consistent with it having broken<\/p>\n
through the mesh in a freefall descent from an<\/p>\n
aircraft. Flight observation logs received by the<\/p>\n
Commission demonstrate that 7 immediately prior<\/p>\n
to the attack 7 several Syrian Government Mil Mi-<\/p>\n
8 (\u201cHip”) helicopters took oti\u2018 from nearby al-<\/p>\n
Dumayr Military Airport and were circling the<\/p>\n
town.<\/p>\n
62. Damage analysis of the improvised gascylinder<\/p>\n
bomb and its positioning appear to<\/p>\n
indicate that it rapidly released large amounts ofa<\/p>\n
substance into the interior space of the residential<\/p>\n
apartment building. The location of victims in<\/p>\n
areas of the building lower than the impact point<\/p>\n
suggests a heavier-thau\u2014air chemical agent, such as<\/p>\n
chlorine, was employed. Positions and physical<\/p>\n
symptoms displayed by victims of thc attack<\/p>\n
support witness claims that the agent acted rapidly,<\/p>\n
and likely indicate that a high concentration of the<\/p>\n
chemical sank downwards.<\/p>\n
63. Forty-nine (49) individuals were killed as a<\/p>\n
result of the attack, most of whom were present in<\/p>\n
the residential building. At the site ofthc incident,<\/p>\n
rescuers reported finding 43 deceased individuals,<\/p>\n
comprising 38 within the building, and five<\/p>\n
outside. Upon evaluating and corroborating<\/p>\n
witness statements, material evidence. and<\/p>\n
comparing lists of victims received, at least 10<\/p>\n
men, 16 women, eight girls, and three boys were<\/p>\n
killed. As entire families perished, the<\/p>\n
Commission was unable to receive a full list of<\/p>\n
names. though the identities of 35 victims were<\/p>\n
conclusively established. In addition, one woman,<\/p>\n
two children, and three men subsequently died<\/p>\n
while being treated at Rit\u2018 Damascus Hospital,<\/p>\n
increasing the overall death toll to 49 individuals.<\/p>\n
64. Statements and material evidence received<\/p>\n
and analysed by the Commission in relation to the<\/p>\n
deceased within the apartment building revealed<\/p>\n
an array of symptoms conmstent with exposure to<\/p>\n
a choking agent7 including signs of foaming at the<\/p>\n
mouth and nose, blue skin indicating impaired<\/p>\n
blood circulation, meiosis (constriction of the<\/p>\n
pupils). as well as some cases of diialed (wide<\/p>\n
open) pupils. Numerous victims unable to flee the<\/p>\n
building collapsed shortly after exposure.<\/p>\n
65. Several interviewees including treating<\/p>\n
medical staff confirmed that up to 650 more<\/p>\n
indivtduals required medical attendance after<\/p>\n
being exposed to a chemical agent. One<\/p>\n
interviewee recounted how the Rif Damascus<\/p>\n
Hospital received approximately 500 patients<\/p>\n
within two hours of the attack, all of whom<\/p>\n
presented moderate to severe cases of exposure<\/p>\n
consistent with chlorine inhalation. Another<\/p>\n
medical staff recounted having personally treated<\/p>\n
more than 50 victims 7 some 30 children, 15<\/p>\n
women, and 10 men.<\/p>\n
66. The majority of victims sustained minor<\/p>\n
injuries including throat hum, coughing, and<\/p>\n
difficulties in breathing. The treatment of those<\/p>\n
moderately affected included immediate removal<\/p>\n
of their clothes, thorough washing. and provision<\/p>\n
of oxygen. inhalers, and medicine to assist<\/p>\n
breathing (9.35., Sal’hutamol). In more severe cases,<\/p>\n
atropine and corticosteroids were used.<\/p>\n
67. Numerous victims and witnesses described<\/p>\n
the strong, distinctive odour of chlorine emanating<\/p>\n
from the impact site, in areas surrounding the<\/p>\n
residential building, at the entrance of the tunnel to<\/p>\n
Rif Damascus Hospital, and on the bodies and<\/p>\n
clothes of victims delivered to the hospital. First<\/p>\n
responders attempting to reach the scene in its<\/p>\n
immediate aftermath were impeded by the<\/p>\n
overwheiming smell ofchlorine.<\/p>\n
68. Symptoms reported by victims and<\/p>\n
witnesses, as well as those visible on material<\/p>\n
evidence received by the Commission, are<\/p>\n
consistent with the use ofa choking agent such as<\/p>\n
chlorine, The majority of fatalities as well as<\/p>\n
surviving Victims with varying degrees of<\/p>\n
exposure showed no signs of external injury.<\/p>\n
Rather, the symptoms exhibited by victims were<\/p>\n
indicative of poisoning consistent with exposure to<\/p>\n
a high concentration of a toxic chemical, and<\/p>\n
material evidence supports this theory. Remnants<\/p>\n
of the weapons delivery system analysed by the<\/p>\n
Commission are consistent with an improvised<\/p>\n
chemical weapon delivered from the air, which<\/p>\n
disseminated a liquefied, compressed gas.<\/p>\n
Statements from observers, victims, first<\/p>\n
responders, and medical staff corroborate each<\/p>\n
other and support this conclusion.<\/p>\n
69. While it is highly likely that chlorine was<\/p>\n
released, it cannot be ruled out at this stage that<\/p>\n
another chemical agent was simultaneously<\/p>\n
employed. A more likely alternative to the<\/p>\n
combined use of two chemical agents would be a<\/p>\n
massive chlorine release at a highly lethal<\/p>\n
concentration, triggering acute respiratory distress<\/p>\n
syndrome and near-immediate collapse.<\/p>\n
70. By launching chemical attacks on xxx,<\/p>\n
there are reasonable grounds to believe that<\/p>\n
Government forces committed the war crime of<\/p>\n
taunching indiscriminate attacks in a civilian<\/p>\n
populated area, in further violation of the right to<\/p>\n
life, liberty, and security of person (Annex III,<\/p>\n
paras. xx-xx). The use of chemical weapons<\/p>\n
further violated the Convention on the Prohibition<\/p>\n
of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and<\/p>\n
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their<\/p>\n
Destruction, ratified by the Syrian Arab Republic<\/p>\n
in 2013.<\/p>\n